Judicially Non-Enforcible Provisions of Constitutions

Abstract

In the constitutional law of the United States there is a natural tendency to emphasize the judicial enforcibility of constitutional restrictions upon legislative action. This field of our law tends thus to give primary weight to a technical analysis of judicial decisions, at the expense of a consideration of the wisdom and expediency of legislative and executive action. Moreover, it largely overlooks a relatively large field of constitutional regulation not supplemented by judicial enforcibility. We often compare to our advantage the system of judicially enforcible constitutions with that of many other countries in which written constitutions are not judicially enforcible but depend for their effectiveness upon the political forces operating within or upon the government.' Something of more definite value may perhaps be gained from an examination of the provisions of the federal and state constitutions that are not judicially enforcible under our system of constitutional law. To what extent do such provisions exist, and to what extent do they accomplish their purpose as effectively as judicially enforcible provisions?