Analysis of Tort Cases
dc.contributor.author | Green, Leon | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:43.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:45:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:45:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1929-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/4456 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Leon Green, Analysis of Tort Cases, 35 W. VA. LQ 323 (1928). | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 4222138 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3950 | |
dc.description.abstract | The discussion of any problem of law must begin with the assumption that it can be adequately handled by some accepted legal theory, or that it can be made to submit to some such theory yet to be designed. An adequate working hypothesis is as necessary to a legal science as to any other science. Needless to say there has been no comprehensive system of legal theory designed to take care of all the problems which arise under government. Any system which there may be is made up of numerous fragmentary parts, each fashioned to handle a particular group of problems, and even these larger parts are made up of still smaller fragments. For instance, there are groups of contract problems, agency problems, corporation problems, tort problems, but each one of these groups is controlled by a conglomerate of theories rather than by a single theory. Difficulties and misunderstandings arise largely out of the clashings and contradictions of a multitude of helter-skelter theories improvised for the day and perpetuated to plague legal science indefinitely. | |
dc.subject | legal theory | |
dc.subject | tort | |
dc.subject | judicial process | |
dc.title | Analysis of Tort Cases | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:45:30Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4456 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5461&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |