Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Abstract

THE authority given to the IYnited States Supreme Court by the Act of June 19, 1934, to prescribe uniform rules of procedure for federal civil actions at law and to unite the federal law and equity practices aptly was said, to afford "an unusual opportunity for introducing effective measures of reform in law administration into our most extended court system and of developing a procedure which may properly be a model to all the states."' That the Court intends to avail itself of this opportunity is evidenced both by its decision to proceed "with the preparation of a unified system of rules for cases in equity and actions at law," rather than to limit the rules to common-law cases, as it might have done under the act, and by its appointment of an advisory committee to assist in this undertaking. There can be no thoroughly effective reform in law administration, however, without an adequate treatment of the matter of evidence. In the application of proper rules of law to the substantive interests involved in litigation, rules of evidence which aid or hamper a court in its investigation of a fact situation, depending upon the character of the rules, are as important as the rules which govern the litigation prior and subsequent to the trial. Modern and liberal rules covering the commencement of an action, pleading, parties, judgments, provisional and final remedies and appellate procedure will be small solace to a party who finds a meritorious case thwarted by a rule of evidence of medieval origin and doubtful merit.