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dc.contributor.authorWilliamson, Oliver
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:42.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:45:17Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:45:17Z
dc.date.issued1987-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/4391
dc.identifier.contextkey4191223
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3879
dc.description.abstractBoth the law and economics of antitrust have undergone significant change in the past twenty years. The expansive antitrust attitudes and enforcement practices of the 1960s have been delimited. Greater respect for economies and the subtleties of market processes and competition have developed. Efforts to focus antitrust policy and further delimit antitrust enforcement are in progress. Although I am sympathetic with these general purposes, I am also concerned with overshooting. Part I of this article examines the changing attitudes toward antitrust and distinguishes between inflexible legal rule and more flexible legal process bases for delimiting enforcement. Part II assesses the "filters" approach to antitrust proposed by Frank Easterbrook,1 parts of which have been embraced by the enforcement agencies and the courts. Part III sketches the scope of strategic behavior. Several recent cases in which filter and strategic behavior issues arise are discussed in part IV.
dc.subjectantitrust
dc.subjectfilter
dc.subjectstrategic behavior
dc.titleDelimiting Antitrust
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:45:17Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4391
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5396&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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