Field Theory and Judicial Logic

Abstract

ANYONE who has read the statement of facts in a large number of briefs of appellants and appellees is likely to conclude that any resemblances between opposing accounts of the same facts are purely fortuitous and unintentional. The impression that opposing lawyers seldom agree on the facts is strengthened if one listens to opposing counsel in almost any trial. Now, as a matter of simple logic, two inconsistent statements cannot both be true. At least one must be false. And it is always possible that both are false, as, for example, when the plaintiff's attorney says the defendant speeded into the zone of the accident at sixty miles an hour and the defendant's counsel insists his client was jogging along at twenty miles an hour, while, in fact, he was moving at forty miles an hour. Thus, a logician may conclude that either (1) at least half of our practicing lawyers utter falsehoods whenever they open their mouths or fountain pens, or (2) that a substantial majority of practicing lawyers utter falsehoods on a substantial number of such occasions. If we define a liar as a person who frequently utters such falsehoods,' it would seem to follow logically that most lawyers are liars.