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dc.contributor.authorColeman, Jules
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:41.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:44:41Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:44:41Z
dc.date.issued1995-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/4210
dc.identifier.contextkey4158594
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3679
dc.description.abstractIn a recent book, I set out the contours of a conception of corrective justice, and tentatively explored aspects of its relationship to Anglo-American tort law. I argued that corrective justice is the principle that those who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law embodies this conception of corrective justice. One could object to my argument on at least two grounds. One might accept my characterization of corrective justice, but deny that, so conceived, it is reflected in our tort practices, or one might reject my conception of corrective justice.
dc.titleThe Practice of Corrective Justice
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:44:41Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4210
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5202&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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