The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice
dc.contributor.author | Coleman, Jules | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:41.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:44:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:44:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1992-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/4207 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 4158607 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3675 | |
dc.description.abstract | In contemporary tort theory, both economists and moralists advance the view that tort law can be understood as the embodiment of one fundamental, overarching principle. For economists it is the principle of efficiency. For some moralists, like George Fletcher, it is the principle of reciprocity of risk. While for others, like Richard Epstein, it is the principle of causal responsibility. In contrast, I reject the idea that the practice can be understood as a unified whole and argue that tort law implements a variety of different principles and policies. Some of these are economic in nature, others moral. In this Essay, I develop the underlying moral principle involved in tort law–the principle of corrective justice. | |
dc.title | The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:44:41Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4207 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5205&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |