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dc.contributor.authorColeman, Jules
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:40.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:44:39Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:44:39Z
dc.date.issued1986-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/4199
dc.identifier.contextkey4158662
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3665
dc.description.abstractIn the economic approach to law, legal rights are designed, in part, to overcome the conditions under which markets fail. In correcting for market failure, economic analysis endorses two rules for assigning legal rights.
dc.titleRethinking the Theory of Legal Rights
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:44:39Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4199
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5213&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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