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dc.contributor.authorColeman, Jules
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:40.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:44:38Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:44:38Z
dc.date.issued1991-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/4194
dc.identifier.contextkey4158691
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3660
dc.description.abstractRonald Dworkin has identified H.L.A. Hart with the view that law consists in rules.1 That attribution is partially understandable, if ultimately unwarranted. Hart does claim that law consists in rules, but he also explicitly acknowledges that customary norms can constitute part of a community's law though they are not rules. Even if Dworkin overstates the point, it is true that rules are essential both to Hart's jurisprudence and to his theory of adjudication. Why is it that law, for Hart, is primarily a matter of rules?
dc.titleRules and Social Facts
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:44:38Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4194
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5218&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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