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dc.contributor.authorEly, John
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:40.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:44:23Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:44:23Z
dc.date.issued1973-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/4112
dc.identifier.contextkey4106958
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3571
dc.description.abstractIn Roe v. Wade, decided January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court–Justice Blackmun speaking for everyone but Justices White and Rehnquist–held unconstitutional Texas's (and virtually every other state's) criminal abortion statute. The broad outlines of its argument are not difficult to make out: 1. The right to privacy, though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2. This right "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 3. This right to an abortion is "fundamental" and can therefore be regulated only on the basis of a "compelling" state interest." 4. The state does have two "important and legitimate" interests here, the first in protecting maternal health, the second in protecting the life (or potential life) of the fetus. But neither can be counted "compelling" throughout the entire pregnancy: Each matures with the unborn child.
dc.titleThe Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:44:23Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4112
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5116&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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