The Judicial Review Game

dc.contributor.author	Eskridge, William
dc.date	2021-11-25T13:34:38.000
dc.date.accessioned	2021-11-26T11:43:27Z
dc.date.available	2021-11-26T11:43:27Z
dc.date.issued	1993-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifier	fss_papers/3840
dc.identifier.contextkey	3206594
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/3270
dc.description.abstract	The conventional wisdom in legal scholarship has been that aggressive judicial review is the creation of activist judges seeking to read their preferences into the Constitution and that this type of activism is problematic in a representative democracy. This wisdom has traditionally rested upon little systematic positive or normative political theory. Public choice theory, the application of economic supply (legislator) and demand (interest group) concepts to public law, is a descriptive theory that provides interesting insights about the legislative process, and it was the rage among law professors in the 1980s. Thus informed, legal scholars questioned the conventional wisdom about judicial review.
dc.title	The Judicial Review Game
dc.source.journaltitle	Faculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA	2021-11-26T11:43:27Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage	https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3840
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext	https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4812&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1

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