The Case for Specific Performance
| dc.contributor.author | Schwartz, Alan | |
| dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:14.000 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:34:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:34:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1979-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
| dc.identifier | fss_papers/1118 | |
| dc.identifier.contextkey | 1673279 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/310 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The purpose of contract remedies is to place a disappointed promisee in as good a position as he would have enjoyed had his promisor performed. Contract law has two methods of achieving this "compensation goal": requiring the breaching party to pay damages, either to enable the promisee to purchase a substitute performance, or to replace the net gains that the promised performance would have generated; or requiring the breaching party to render the promised performance. Although the damages remedy is always available to a disappointed promisee under current law, the remedy of specific performance is available only at the discretion of the court. Moreover, courts seldom enforce contract clauses that explicitly provide for specific performance in the event of breach. | |
| dc.title | The Case for Specific Performance | |
| dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:34:50Z | |
| dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1118 | |
| dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2104&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |
