Products Liability and Judicial Wealth Redistributions
dc.contributor.author | Schwartz, Alan | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:14.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:34:49Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:34:49Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1976-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/1114 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 1673303 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/306 | |
dc.description.abstract | Rules which redistribute wealth make some people better off at the expense of other people; they improve the welfare of particular persons' by giving them money, goods, or services. Rules which are sometimes termed general encourage the performance of duties with which all must comply; they improve the general welfare by enabling activities to be carried on efficiently, safely, and predictably. Legal rules sometimes have both distributional and general effects. Thus reducing poverty, a distributional goal, may reduce crime, which would in turn facilitate commerce. And enforcing contracts, pursuant to the general rule requiring this, redistributes wealth in favor of prudent bargainers. I will characterize a legal rule as "distributional" if (i) it produces only distributional effects or (ii) is adopted because its distributional effects are sought. A rule is then "general" if (i) it produces no distributional effects or (ii) is adopted because its general welfare effects are sought. | |
dc.title | Products Liability and Judicial Wealth Redistributions | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:34:49Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1114 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2108&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |