Relations, Legal and Otherwise

Abstract

In his latest criticism of the Hohfeld system of legal analysis, Professor Albert Kocourek expresses surprise that in spite of the defects to which he has directed attention it continues to prosper. It is suggested that the reason for such prosperity is that the system has a direct relation to the problems before not merely the student,'but the lawyer and the judge, and that its cultivation brings practical results. Making the discriminations called for by this system means the difference between winning and losing cases, between decisions for the plaintiff and decisions for the defendant. Thus it satisfies the pragmatic definition of truth as given by Mr. Dooley: "If it works, it's true." And it is also suggested that recent learned criticisms of the system miss fire for the reason that they do not take its practical character into consideration. They are concerned with a formal sys- tem of jurisprudence, defined according to the methods of philosophy in a manner which shall be intellectually satisfactory to the definer; they are not concerned with the supplying of necessary tools--and adequate analysis and legal terminology--to the practical solution of every day legal problems.