Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases
dc.contributor.author | James, Fleming | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:31.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:41:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:41:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1953-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/3195 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 2297402 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/2584 | |
dc.description.abstract | If a man has failed to meet the standard of conduct required by law, his conduct may be called negligent, and in most accident cases the principal questions as to liability turn upon whether the parties have met this standard. But breach of the standard by a defendant is not always attended by liability. There are several ways in which the law limits liability for negligence. (1) It often bars recovery because of the plaintiff's conduct (e.g., by contributory negligence); (2) it allows recovery only for items of damage which it considers as not too remote; (3) it allows recovery only where there was an antecedent duty to use care with respect to the interest invaded. The two limitations last mentioned are often used in a confused and overlapping way. We shall try, however, to examine them separately, giving attention here to the scope of the duty to take care. | |
dc.subject | Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases | |
dc.subject | 47 NW. U.L. Rev. 778 (1953) | |
dc.title | Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:41:22Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3195 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4171&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |