Self-Help and the Nature of Property
dc.contributor.author | Smith, Henry | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:31.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:41:10Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:41:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/3136 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 2272293 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/2520 | |
dc.description.abstract | Self-help and the law's response to it lie at the center of a system of property rights. This has become all the more apparent as questions of property - and whether to employ property law at all - have arisen in the digital world. In this Article, I argue that self-help comes in different varieties corresponding to different strategies for delineating entitlements. Like property entitlements more generally, the law does not regulate self-help in as detailed a fashion as it could if delineation were costless. Both property entitlements and self-help show far less symmetry and a far lesser degree of tailoring than we would expect in a world in which we did not face delineation costs of devising, describing, communicating, and enforcing the content of rights and privileges to use resources. | |
dc.title | Self-Help and the Nature of Property | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:41:10Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3136 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4051&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |