Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange
dc.contributor.author | Corbin, Arthur | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:30.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:40:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:40:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1922-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/3000 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 2256338 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/2371 | |
dc.description.abstract | The prevailing concept of "property" is often rudely tested in taxation cases. The rules laid down in statutes and decisions have often been constructed with the idea that property is a physical res-an object of sensation. As such, property would always have a “situs”- 'a relation in space to other objects of sense. But a chose in action is also property, although it is not a thing or res-an object of sense. Our concept of property has shifted; incorporeal rights have become property. And finally, "property" has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities. Such is the case whether these relations affect the consumption and enjoyment of some particular object of sense or not. | |
dc.title | Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:40:42Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/3000 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3971&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |