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dc.contributor.authorSchwartz, Alan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:30.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:40:40Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:40:40Z
dc.date.issued2008-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/299
dc.identifier.contextkey1607464
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/2357
dc.description.abstractThis article asks whether competition can ameliorate the consequences of cognitive error. Consumers differ cognitively, some being more prone to err (the “naive”) than others (the “sophisticated”). Competition among firms is analyzed with a search equilibrium model. Firms offer an exploitative contract or a naive contract to a consumer population partitioned in two ways: some consumers are sophisticated while others are naive, and some consumers search for preferred contracts while others visit one firm. There are two principal results. First, when consumers shop, neither contract type is priced monopolistically, and competitive pricing sometimes obtains. Second, when enough consumers are sophisticated and the naive have a relatively low willingness to pay for their preferred contract, exploitative contracts decline in frequency and may actually vanish. These results suggest that while decision makers should continue to ask if consumers suffer from cognitive error, they also should ask whether markets do, or could be helped to, ameliorate error’s consequences.
dc.titleHow Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:40:40Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/299
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1298&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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