The Rule of Law as a Source of Constitutional Change
| dc.contributor.author | Balkin, Jack | |
| dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:29.000 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:40:18Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:40:18Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1989-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
| dc.identifier | fss_papers/288 | |
| dc.identifier.contextkey | 1607176 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/2238 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Does the fact that the Constitution is law tell us anything about the proper method of interpreting it or in any way constrain the sorts of interpretations that we might make? The assumption underlying this question is that if the Constitution is law, and therefore must adhere to the ideal of the Rule of Law, some interpretive theories of the Constitution might thereby be foreclosed. In particular, Professor Alexander's essay suggests that one type of theory, a "perfectionist theory," is inconsistent with the Constitution understood in this way. Let me quote a particularly interesting passage in his essay, in which he makes this point as part of an argument for a "hard law" theory of the Constitution. | |
| dc.title | The Rule of Law as a Source of Constitutional Change | |
| dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:40:18Z | |
| dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/288 | |
| dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1287&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |
