Crisis and Change at the United Nations: Non-Amendment Reform and Institutional Evolution

Abstract

The Security Council’s inaction in response to the wars in Gaza and Ukraine has once again put a spotlight on structural problems at the United Nations (“U.N.”). Security Council paralysis—particularly the (mis)use of the veto power afforded to the permanent five (“P5”) members of the Council—has long prompted calls for reform. Yet the same veto power prevents nearly all efforts to reform the organization through the formal amendment process provided in the U.N. Charter. This article argues that there is an alternative way forward: what we call “non-amendment reform.” Rather than seek formal amendments that are unlikely to survive the veto of the P5 members, advocates of change should support change through evolving interpretations of the Charter. Non-amendment reform can provide a way for the United Nations to act in the face of a veto threat. Indeed, thanks to an earlier non-amendment reform, the Uniting for Peace Resolution, paralysis of the Security Council during the wars in Gaza and Ukraine has not prevented the United Nations from acting. Although non-amendment reform has been overlooked by scholars, it has long been critical to the capacity of the United Nations to respond to crises. This article demonstrates that a four-stage process—trigger, proposal, contestation leading to a new interpretation, and consolidation—has led to non-amendment reform at key moments throughout the United Nations’ history. Learning a lesson from the past, today’s advocates of change should channel their efforts towards non-amendment reform to enable the United Nations to meet the challenges of the moment. This article outlines four current opportunities to do just that.