The Public Law of Public Utilities

Abstract

This Article describes the constitutional history of public utility regulation to make sense of apparent puzzles and inconsistencies in modern administrative law. In chronicling this history, we first show that utilities’ special constitutional right to challenge regulations on substantive-due-process grounds is based on a public-private distinction that courts have otherwise rejected. Second, we argue that modern efforts to invoke Article III to restrict agency adjudication do not reflect a consistent understanding of the public-private distinction, but instead revive the distinction in some contexts (adjudication) but not others (rulemaking). Third, we provide a new framework for understanding the Supreme Court’s turn to structural arguments to check administrative agencies. On the last point: for nearly five decades prior to 1935, courts used rights-based arguments, not structural ones such as the nondelegation doctrine, to deduce the scope and content of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Once the Supreme Court abandoned its freedom-ofcontract jurisprudence, it was a public utility case that breathed new life into the nondelegation doctrine. Public utilities were a natural battle ground for reshaping the public law of administration. Like today, private rights, delegation, and agency adjudication were all central preoccupations of this public utility moment, but the frameworks courts advanced to answer these puzzles have vanished from our modern debate. Today’s administrative law thus reflects an ad hoc revival of public utility legal concepts, and it reinvents these concepts such that they bear little resemblance to their public utility genealogy.