Sentence Modification in Connecticut: A Guide for Those Navigating the 53a-39 Process
Abstract
Title 53a, Chapter 952, Section 53a-39 of the Connecticut General Statutes governs sentence modifications across the state. The clinic’s guide details the 53a-39 sentence modification process and includes information on gathering and organizing the materials necessary to create the most compelling petition possible. It outlines the ways in which supporters can be most helpful to a person seeking a sentence modification and provides the information, templates, and official forms necessary to navigate the sentence modification process.Collections
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