ON WRONGS AND JUSTIFICATIONS

Abstract

In this paper, my goal is to shed light on a recent debate regarding the nature of justifications and wrongs in criminal law. As we delve deeper into the topic, we will see that wrongs and justifications are conceptually intertwined, and it is, therefore, crucial to have a clear understanding of their nature. The theoretical disputes and perplexities surrounding this topic can be attributed, in part, to an improper conception of moral wrongs. However, once we have a better understanding of this phenomenon, we will be able to account for many of the issues associated with the nature of justifications in criminal law. The distinction between offence denials and justifications is not morally neutral. The former assumes that there are no decisive moral reasons against performing an action. In short, they deny the existence of an offense altogether. Justifications, on the other hand, acknowledge the existence of an offense but deny that the conduct is wrong all things considered. To have a defense is to concede the existence of a pro tanto wrong or a provisional complaint, but to reject the claim that the conduct is wrongful in the particular context in question.