The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights in Argentina: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Economic Emergency

Abstract

This dissertation addresses the topic of the constitutional protection of property rights in the context of economic emergencies, especially —although not exclusively— in cases of financial crises. In so doing, it brings together several different strands that seldom appear side-by-side in the constitutional theory literature: emergency powers, property theory (especially, takings-related notions), constitutional interpretation, legal and institutional history, public choice, and theories of justice. It also resorts to recent empirical work on the legitimacy of courts and relies on insights from the fields of economics and behavioral economics to shed light on some of the more disquieting questions posed by the phenomenon of economic emergency. Throughout this journey, I will try to convince the reader that many of our most common assumptions regarding the role of courts in socio-economic matters and the place of property rights in the constitutional space, among others, deserve a profound revision. Conventional wisdom will be frequently put to question. While this work uses Argentina‘s history as a case study, it certainly aspires to offer quite a few insights that may contribute to the broader, global debate over constitutional property and over emergency powers.