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dc.contributor.authorFerreres, Victor
dc.date2021-11-25T13:36:34.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:31:26Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:31:26Z
dc.date.issued2004-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryls_sela/39
dc.identifier.contextkey3111268
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17535
dc.description.abstractIf one examines the legal landscape of contemporary Europe, one will be struck by the institutional salience of Constitutional Courts. In a long evolution that started after the First World War and that reached its climax after the fall of Communism, most European countries have established these special courts in order to protect their national Constitutions against offensive legislation. Europe is now clearly associated with a “centralized model” of constitutional review, where only one court has authority to strike down a statute as unconstitutional, while the United States exemplifies the “decentralized model”, where all courts are empowered to set aside legislation if it violates the Constitution.
dc.subjectJudicial power
dc.subjectconstitutional review
dc.subjectjudicial activism
dc.subjectjudicial passivism
dc.subjectconstitutional avoidance
dc.titleTHE CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRALIZING CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN A SPECIAL COURT. SOME THOUGHTS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM.
dc.source.journaltitleSELA (Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política) Papers
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:31:26Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/39
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=yls_sela&unstamped=1


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