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dc.contributor.authorBullard, Alfredo
dc.date2021-11-25T13:36:34.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:31:24Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:31:24Z
dc.date.issued2004-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifieryls_sela/32
dc.identifier.contextkey3110775
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17528
dc.description.abstractImagine a hypothetical country in which three constitutional reforms are made. The first is to change the economic system so that decisions concerning the production of private goods are made democratically. The second is to change the political system so that decisions concerning the production of public goods are made by the market. The third is to subject the existence of individual rights to majority approval. Analyzing these reforms helps us understand the limits that the economy imposes on democracy, and those that democracy imposes on the market.
dc.subjectmarket economy and democracy
dc.subjectindividual rights
dc.subjectpreference aggregations
dc.subjectminority protection
dc.subjectstability conventions
dc.subjectpolitical system
dc.subjectpublic goods
dc.subjectpivate goods
dc.titleIncomplete Democracy: Why Democracy Cannot Survive Without the Market
dc.source.journaltitleSELA (Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política) Papers
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:31:24Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/32
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=yls_sela&unstamped=1


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