Incomplete Democracy: Why Democracy Cannot Survive Without the Market
| dc.contributor.author | Bullard, Alfredo | |
| dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:36:34.000 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:31:24Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:31:24Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2004-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
| dc.identifier | yls_sela/32 | |
| dc.identifier.contextkey | 3110775 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17528 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Imagine a hypothetical country in which three constitutional reforms are made. The first is to change the economic system so that decisions concerning the production of private goods are made democratically. The second is to change the political system so that decisions concerning the production of public goods are made by the market. The third is to subject the existence of individual rights to majority approval. Analyzing these reforms helps us understand the limits that the economy imposes on democracy, and those that democracy imposes on the market. | |
| dc.subject | market economy and democracy | |
| dc.subject | individual rights | |
| dc.subject | preference aggregations | |
| dc.subject | minority protection | |
| dc.subject | stability conventions | |
| dc.subject | political system | |
| dc.subject | public goods | |
| dc.subject | pivate goods | |
| dc.title | Incomplete Democracy: Why Democracy Cannot Survive Without the Market | |
| dc.source.journaltitle | SELA (Seminario en Latinoamérica de Teoría Constitucional y Política) Papers | |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:31:24Z | |
| dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yls_sela/32 | |
| dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=yls_sela&unstamped=1 |
