Credit Ratings, Congress, and Mandatory Self Reliance
dc.contributor.author | Mollengarden, Zachary | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:36:32.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:30:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:30:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-05-05T12:47:30-07:00 | |
dc.identifier | ylpr/vol36/iss2/5 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 14432729 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17280 | |
dc.description.abstract | Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires federal agencies to identify, remove, and replace all references to credit ratings in their regulations. It responds to longstanding concerns heightened by the recent financial crisis-that investors place undue reliance on the opinions of a small number of eminently fallible (and perhaps fundamentally conflicted) credit rating agencies. At first blush, the approach adopted in§ 939A appears commonsense: if one wishes to reduce reliance on credit ratings, amending regulations that compel investors to consult credit ratings seems like a straightforward place to start. This Note reconsiders: what appears straightforward in principle has proved to be anything but in practice. | |
dc.title | Credit Ratings, Congress, and Mandatory Self Reliance | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Law & Policy Review | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:30:29Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylpr/vol36/iss2/5 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1728&context=ylpr&unstamped=1 |