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dc.contributor.authorMollengarden, Zachary
dc.date2021-11-25T13:36:32.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:30:28Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:30:28Z
dc.date.issued2019-05-05T12:47:30-07:00
dc.identifierylpr/vol36/iss2/5
dc.identifier.contextkey14432729
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17280
dc.description.abstractSection 939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires federal agencies to identify, remove, and replace all references to credit ratings in their regulations. It responds to longstanding concerns­ heightened by the recent financial crisis-that investors place undue reliance on the opinions of a small number of eminently fallible (and perhaps fundamentally conflicted) credit rating agencies. At first blush, the approach adopted in§ 939A appears commonsense: if one wishes to reduce reliance on credit ratings, amending regulations that compel investors to consult credit ratings seems like a straightforward place to start. This Note reconsiders: what appears straightforward in principle has proved to be anything but in practice.
dc.titleCredit Ratings, Congress, and Mandatory Self Reliance
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law & Policy Review
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:30:29Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylpr/vol36/iss2/5
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1728&context=ylpr&unstamped=1


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