The Congressional Budget Office and the Demand for Pseudoscience Policy Essay
dc.contributor.author | kling, Arnold | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:36:32.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:30:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:30:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-09-09T10:05:26-07:00 | |
dc.identifier | ylpr/vol36/iss1/1 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 12810903 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17271 | |
dc.description.abstract | Politicians and journalists who participate in the policymaking process fail to appreciate the limitations of the analytical models used by the Congressional Budget Office (CEO). The demand for pseudoscience leads to unwise policy choices. Although the CEO is nonpartisan, the presentation of its model results serves to focus attention on scenarios that are favorable to intervention and to deficit spending. But the policy discussion does not include scenarios in which intervention fails to accomplish intended results or where economic shocks make a large government debt problematic. This Essay recommends ways for Congress to redirect the CEO, resulting in analysis and reporting that would provide better support for public policy. | |
dc.title | The Congressional Budget Office and the Demand for Pseudoscience Policy Essay | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Law & Policy Review | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:30:26Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylpr/vol36/iss1/1 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1719&context=ylpr&unstamped=1 |