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dc.contributor.authorkling, Arnold
dc.date2021-11-25T13:36:32.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:30:26Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:30:26Z
dc.date.issued2018-09-09T10:05:26-07:00
dc.identifierylpr/vol36/iss1/1
dc.identifier.contextkey12810903
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17271
dc.description.abstractPoliticians and journalists who participate in the policymaking process fail to appreciate the limitations of the analytical models used by the Congressional Budget Office (CEO). The demand for pseudoscience leads to unwise policy choic­es. Although the CEO is nonpartisan, the presentation of its model results serves to focus attention on scenarios that are favorable to intervention and to deficit spending. But the policy discussion does not include scenarios in which interven­tion fails to accomplish intended results or where economic shocks make a large government debt problematic. This Essay recommends ways for Congress to redi­rect the CEO, resulting in analysis and reporting that would provide better sup­port for public policy.
dc.titleThe Congressional Budget Office and the Demand for Pseudoscience Policy Essay
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law & Policy Review
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:30:26Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylpr/vol36/iss1/1
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1719&context=ylpr&unstamped=1


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