• Login
    View Item 
    •   Home
    • Yale
    • Yale Law and Policy Review
    • View Item
    •   Home
    • Yale
    • Yale Law and Policy Review
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Browse

    All of openYLSCommunitiesPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionPublication DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    LoginRegister

    Statistics

    Display statistics

    Coughing up Executives or Rolling the Dice: Individual Accountability for Corporate Corruption

    • CSV
    • RefMan
    • EndNote
    • BibTex
    • RefWorks
    Thumbnail
    Name:
    Oded_Sharon.pdf
    Size:
    2.287Mb
    Format:
    PDF
    Download
    Author
    Oded, Sharon
    
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17263
    Abstract
    Anti-bribery enforcement continues to intensify on a global scale. More than ever before, multinational corporations currently face high financial and reputational risks relating to bribery and other corrupt practices. These increasing risks result predominantly from an escalating enforcement of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). This escalation is clearly demonstrated by an increase in the ticket price of FCPA actions in recent years: in 2014, for instance, companies paid on average more than $150 million to resolve FCPA cases. This value is about seven-and-a-half times higher than the average total value of monetary resolutions of corporate FCPA cases in 2012 and almost double the same value in 2013.
    Collections
    Yale Law and Policy Review

    entitlement

     
    DSpace software (copyright © 2002 - 2023)  DuraSpace
    Quick Guide | Contact Us
    Open Repository is a service operated by 
    Atmire NV
     

    Export search results

    The export option will allow you to export the current search results of the entered query to a file. Different formats are available for download. To export the items, click on the button corresponding with the preferred download format.

    By default, clicking on the export buttons will result in a download of the allowed maximum amount of items.

    To select a subset of the search results, click "Selective Export" button and make a selection of the items you want to export. The amount of items that can be exported at once is similarly restricted as the full export.

    After making a selection, click one of the export format buttons. The amount of items that will be exported is indicated in the bubble next to export format.