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dc.contributor.authorRoss-Harrington, Jonathan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:36:30.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:29:45Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:29:45Z
dc.date.issued2015-12-03T08:54:45-08:00
dc.identifierylpr/vol28/iss1/7
dc.identifier.contextkey7900676
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17114
dc.description.abstractThere is tension in the universe of entity property forms-tension between the traditional conception of the residential leasehold interest and the expanding property form known as the common-interest community. Commoninterest communities, a mix of both fee simple and tenancy in common property, are distinguished by collective governance regimes that impose restrictions on property owners through the use of ever-evolving covenants. These restrictions are determined, amended, and enforced through majoritarian governance, such that these communities effectively form "private governments."' Condominiums, the subject of this Note, are among the fastest growing forms of these private governments.
dc.titleProperty Forms in Tension: Preference Inefficiency, Rent-Seeking, and the Problem of Notice in the Modern Condominium
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law & Policy Review
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:29:46Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylpr/vol28/iss1/7
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1588&context=ylpr&unstamped=1


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