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dc.contributor.authorHuitema, David
dc.date2021-11-25T13:36:28.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:28:56Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:28:56Z
dc.date.issued2015-11-06T10:46:11-08:00
dc.identifierylpr/vol18/iss2/3
dc.identifier.contextkey7807878
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/16898
dc.description.abstractIn its 1966 Miranda decision, the Supreme Court announced that a criminal defendant's statement, if made during custodial interrogation, would not be admissible in state or federal court if the police failed to advise the defendant of her right to remain silent and have an attorney present during the question ing. Two years later, Congress attempted to "legislatively overrule" Miranda as applied in federal court. Based on Congress's power to make the rules of evidence and procedure for the federal courts, Section 3501 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 dictated that a defendant's statement to the police during custodial interrogation would be admissible as long as it was made voluntarily. This had been the standard for admitting confessions before Miranda, and it required courts to determine by a totality of the evidence whether the police had "overborne" the defendant's "will.",
dc.titleMiranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law & Policy Review
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:28:56Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylpr/vol18/iss2/3
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1388&context=ylpr&unstamped=1


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