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dc.contributor.authorElliott, E. Donald
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:23.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:38:12Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:38:12Z
dc.date.issued1989-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/2201
dc.identifier.contextkey1893894
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/1498
dc.description.abstractShould the "ancient rule" of punitive damages, which authorizes juries to award private fines in civil cases, be abandoned or "maintained" by supplying "new reasons more fitted to the time"? That is the central question underlying this Symposium, and the current debate concerning punitive damages. The answer, I submit, turns on what purposes we want the private tort law system to serve, a subject which is itself in flux and much debated.
dc.titleWhy Punitive Damages Don’t Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:38:12Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2201
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3203&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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