Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?

Abstract

The recent cases have radically altered the scope of the idea of monopoly—or, more precisely, of "monopolizing," since the statute uses the verb—the activity condemned by Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The legal redefinition of monopoly opens new perspectives, new doubts, and new possibilities of action under the Sherman Act. It is not too much to say that the current revision of Section 2 presents the central issue of doctrine in the entire field of anti-trust law—the concept of market control, which has increasingly become the chief, and often the only issue in anti-trust litigation. The problems arising under Section 2 are closely linked to those of Section 1, and the way in which Section 2 of the Sherman Act develops will inevitably affect the handling of many other categories of controversy under different sections of the statutes. For the propositions of policy which define the scope of Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act are the animating and decisive ideas of the whole body of law which has grown to such massive proportions during the last twenty-five years of anti-trust administration. That process of growth has helped to eliminate much that was extraneous to the broad purposes of the anti-trust laws, and to reformulate their chief propositions in ways which are not only more consistent and coherent than in the past, but as well more directly responsive to the underlying policy of the statute.