The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further
dc.contributor.author | Calabresi, Guido | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:21.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:37:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:37:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1991-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/2014 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 1855319 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/1298 | |
dc.description.abstract | Some fifty-five years ago, in a seminal article called The Nature of the Firm, a young socialist named Ronald Coase sought to explain the existence of firms, of organizations within which markets were replaced by hierarchy and command. Twenty-five years later, in The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase, by then a middle-aged libertarian, indicated how markets could replace hierarchy and command structures to the perceived benefit of those who organized them. Five years ago, at a conference marking the fiftieth anniversary of The Nature of the Firm, Professor Coase described the insight which allowed him to explain the existence of firms in this way: The solution was to realize that there were costs of making transactions in a market economy and that it was necessary to incorporate them into the analysis. This was not done in economics at that time—nor, I may add, is it in most present-day economic theory. | |
dc.title | The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:37:39Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2014 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3063&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |