Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?
dc.contributor.author | Calabresi, Guido | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:34:21.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T11:37:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T11:37:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1968-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | fss_papers/1986 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 1851017 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/1265 | |
dc.description.abstract | For the purposes of this article, I shall assume that the sole aim of any system of accident law is the minimization of the sum of (a) accident costs and (b) the cost of avoiding accident costs. I include in the latter the "cost" in pleasure forgone of undertaking a relatively less desirable but less accident-prone activity, or—what is really the same thing—the cost of engaging in an activity in a safer but more expensive or less pleasurable way. I make this assumption for analytical purposes only. I do not for a moment believe this to be the only aim of accident law. The aim that a system of accident law be "just" or "fair" could only through a rather unhappy twisting of words—and valuation of things which cannot be valued—be made to come within my "cost" formulation. Yet fairness is ultimately a goal which any system of accident law must meet. Everything cannot be discussed at once, however, and, although I believe that the fault system can be shown to be quite "unfair" both relatively and absolutely, I will leave that demonstration to another piece. | |
dc.title | Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs? | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Faculty Scholarship Series | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T11:37:33Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1986 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3040&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1 |