The New York Plan: A Free Choice Modification

Abstract

The New York plan is, in my opinion, the best first party system that has yet been proposed. It has, to be sure, some weaknesses. For instance, a complete system of automobile accident law must provide for the imposition of noninsurable tort fines, preferably income-related, to supplement the enterprise or market deterrence that can be achieved through an intelligent allocation of accident costs. The New York plan does not provide for such a system of tort fines. It is not my purpose, however, to devote this article to a consideration of possible omissions of this kind. Nor do I propose to discuss those characteristics of the plan that I think are especially desirable, for example, that it, unlike the Keeton-O'Connell plan, is not subject to early obsolescence because of inflation. Rather, I intend to discuss the two principal criticisms that have been made of the New York plan, and to suggest a free choice modification which, if worked out in detail, might meet these objections. It is assumed, of course, that the objections that have been made to the plan are motivated by good faith and not by an interest in retaining the status quo.