Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorChua-Rubenfeld, Sophia
dc.contributor.authorCosta, Jr., Frank J.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:40.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:06:47Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:06:47Z
dc.date.issued2019-05-01T00:00:00-07:00
dc.identifierylj/vol128/iss7/5
dc.identifier.contextkey14502353
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10385
dc.description.abstractImagine you apply to be a cashier at a supermarket. At the beginning of the interview, you sign an employment application. You don’t get the job, and your interviewer’s remarks make you suspect it’s because you are Muslim. You sue in federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The supermarket moves to dismiss the suit because your employment application included an agreement to arbitrate all Title VII disputes. The court dismisses your case and compels arbitration.
dc.titleThe Reverse-Entanglement Principle: Why Religious Arbitration of Federal Rights Is Unconstitutional
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law Journal
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:06:47Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol128/iss7/5
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9342&context=ylj&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
Chua_RubenfeldCosta_u2kkhumq.pdf
Size:
390.4Kb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record