Disparate Impact, Unified Law
dc.contributor.author | Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O. | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:40.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:06:45Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:06:45Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-04-01T00:00:00-07:00 | |
dc.identifier | ylj/vol128/iss6/2 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 14480216 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10377 | |
dc.description.abstract | The last decade has seen the largest wave of franchise restrictions since the dark days of Jim Crow. In response to this array of limits, lower courts have recently converged on a two-part test under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This test asks if an electoral practice (1) causes a disparate racial impact (2) through its interaction with social and historical discrimination. Unfortunately, the apparent judicial consensus is only skin-deep. Courts bitterly disagree over basic questions like whether the test applies to specific policies or systems of election administration; whether it is violated by all, or only substantial, disparities; and whether disparities refer to citizens’ compliance with a requirement or to their turnout at the polls. The test also sits on thin constitutional ice. It comes close to finding fault whenever a measure produces a disparate impact and so coexists uneasily with Fourteenth Amendment norms about colorblindness and Congress’s remedial authority. | |
dc.title | Disparate Impact, Unified Law | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Law Journal | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:06:45Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol128/iss6/2 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9334&context=ylj&unstamped=1 |