The Treaty Problem: Understanding the Framers' Approach to International Legal Commitments
dc.contributor.author | Ford, Jade | |
dc.contributor.author | Simmons, Mary Ella | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:40.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:06:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:06:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | ylj/vol128/iss3/5 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 14477830 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10365 | |
dc.description.abstract | In 2014, when the Supreme Court decided Bond v. United States, it confronted an issue of structural federalism that had long vexed advocates of big and small government alike. The issue stemmed from the tension between the broad, exclusive power the Constitution grants to the federal government to conclude international treaties and the limitations that the Constitution places on Congress’s domestic authority vis-à-vis the states. When these powers and limitations conflict, which should win out? How expansive should the federal government’s treaty power be? For both champions and critics of international law, the Court’s response in Bond left much to be desired. | |
dc.title | The Treaty Problem: Understanding the Framers' Approach to International Legal Commitments | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Law Journal | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:06:42Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol128/iss3/5 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9321&context=ylj&unstamped=1 |