The Intercircuit Exclusionary Rule
| dc.contributor.author | Durling, James | |
| dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:40.000 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:06:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:06:39Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-10-01T00:00:00-07:00 | |
| dc.identifier | ylj/vol128/iss1/4 | |
| dc.identifier.contextkey | 14477613 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10356 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Imagine that you commit a crime in Connecticut and then return home to Puerto Rico where you commit another crime. In the course of investigating the second crime (in Puerto Rico), the FBI discovers evidence that implicates you in the first crime. In light of this evidence, the federal government indicts you for the first crime, in accordance with venue rules, in the District of Connecticut. At trial, you argue that the inculpatory evidence should be suppressed because the Second Circuit (the place of the trial) has ruled that similar searches violate the Fourth Amendment. The government, by contrast, argues that the evidence should be admitted because the First Circuit (the place of the search) has ruled that such searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. How should the trial judge rule?1 | |
| dc.title | The Intercircuit Exclusionary Rule | |
| dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Law Journal | |
| refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:06:40Z | |
| dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol128/iss1/4 | |
| dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9312&context=ylj&unstamped=1 |
