How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective
dc.contributor.author | Melamed, A. Douglas | |
dc.contributor.author | Shapiro, Carl | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:39.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:06:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:06:34Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | ylj/vol127/iss7/11 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 14376571 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10336 | |
dc.description.abstract | Much attention has been paid in recent years to legal issues arising from standard setting, assertion of standard-essential patents, and the requirements imposed by standard-setting organizations that standard-essential patents be licensed on reasonable terms. This Feature argues that a fundamental aspect of the antitrust laws, heretofore overlooked in this context, can play an important role in ensuring that the rules established by standard-setting organizations are effective in preventing owners of standard-essential patents from engaging in patent holdup. It has long been a basic principle of antitrust law that when firms collaborate to engage in conduct that has efficiency benefits, like standard-setting, they violate the antitrust laws if their collaboration also harms competition more than necessary to obtain the efficiency benefits. Both standard-setting organizations and their members can violate Section of the Sherman Act if the organization's rules are ineffective in preventing owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they gain as a result of the standard. | |
dc.title | How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Law Journal | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:06:34Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol127/iss7/11 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9300&context=ylj&unstamped=1 |