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dc.contributor.authorMelamed, A. Douglas
dc.contributor.authorShapiro, Carl
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:39.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:06:34Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:06:34Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierylj/vol127/iss7/11
dc.identifier.contextkey14376571
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10336
dc.description.abstractMuch attention has been paid in recent years to legal issues arising from standard setting, assertion of standard-essential patents, and the requirements imposed by standard-setting organizations that standard-essential patents be licensed on reasonable terms. This Feature argues that a fundamental aspect of the antitrust laws, heretofore overlooked in this context, can play an important role in ensuring that the rules established by standard-setting organizations are effective in preventing owners of standard-essential patents from engaging in patent holdup. It has long been a basic principle of antitrust law that when firms collaborate to engage in conduct that has efficiency benefits, like standard-setting, they violate the antitrust laws if their collaboration also harms competition more than necessary to obtain the efficiency benefits. Both standard-setting organizations and their members can violate Section of the Sherman Act if the organization's rules are ineffective in preventing owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they gain as a result of the standard.
dc.titleHow Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law Journal
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:06:34Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol127/iss7/11
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9300&context=ylj&unstamped=1


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