Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorHemphill, C. Scott
dc.contributor.authorRose, Nancy L.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:39.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:06:33Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:06:33Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierylj/vol127/iss7/10
dc.identifier.contextkey14374143
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10335
dc.description.abstractThis Feature examines the antitrust treatment of mergers that harm sellers. We separately consider two mechanisms of harm, increased classical monopsony power and increased bargaining leverage. We show that lost upstream competition is an actionable harm to the competitive process. Our central claim is that harm to sellers in an input market is sufficient to support antitrust liability. We defend this conclusion against the contrary view that demonstrated harm to the merging firms' downstream purchasers or final consumers is an essential element of any antitrust claim. Nor is it necessary for plaintiffs to demonstrate a reduction in the input quantity transacted. We further argue that claimed "efficiencies" premised on a reduction in buy-side competition are not efficiencies at all.
dc.titleMergers that Harm Sellers
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law Journal
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:06:34Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol127/iss7/10
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9299&context=ylj&unstamped=1


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Name:
CScottHemphillNancyLRoseM.pdf
Size:
1.870Mb
Format:
PDF

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record