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dc.contributor.authorDurkee, Melissa J.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:39.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:06:33Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:06:33Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierylj/vol127/iss7/1
dc.identifier.contextkey14373994
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10334
dc.description.abstractAn idiosyncratic array of international rules allows "consultants" to gain special access to international officials and lawmakers. Historically, many of these consultants were public-interest associations like Amnesty International. For this reason, the access rules have been celebrated as a way to democratize international organizations, enhancing their legitimacy and that of the rules they produce. But a focus on the classic public-law virtues of democracy and legitimacy produces a theory at odds with the facts: Many of these international consultants are now industry and trade associations like the World Coal Association, whose principal purpose is to lobby for their corporate clients. The presence of these corporate lobbyists challenges the conventional view, which I call strong legitimacy optimism, by focusing a set of longstanding critiques: Consultant associations are not always representatives of the "global public" and consultation is not robust participation in governance. Moreover, the access rules both overregulate and underregulate access to lawmakers. This critique is particularly salient in the context of business lobbying, where the access rules do not balance the costs and benefits of business access to international lawmaking and governance.
dc.titleInternational Lobbying Law
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law Journal
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:06:33Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol127/iss7/1
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9290&context=ylj&unstamped=1


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