Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation
dc.contributor.author | Levine, Aaron M | |
dc.contributor.author | Macey, Joshua C. | |
dc.date | 2021-11-25T13:35:39.000 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-11-26T12:06:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-11-26T12:06:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00 | |
dc.identifier | ylj/vol127/iss5/4 | |
dc.identifier.contextkey | 14373541 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10328 | |
dc.description.abstract | Almost eight years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, financial institutions remain large, complex, and interconnected. Academics and policymakers across the ideological spectrum largely agree that Dodd-Frank has imposed substantial compliance costs on systematically important financial institutions (SIFis) without solving the problem that they are too big to fail. This Note argues that Dodd-Frank's compliance costs have actually served an important regulatory purpose. By analyzing the spinoffs and divestitures that have occurred at eleven SIFis since Dodd-Frank went into effect in 2010, this Note documents the extent to which the Act's compliance costs have led SIFis to shed business lines of their own accord. | |
dc.title | Dodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation | |
dc.source.journaltitle | Yale Law Journal | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2021-11-26T12:06:32Z | |
dc.identifier.legacycoverpage | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol127/iss5/4 | |
dc.identifier.legacyfulltext | https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9284&context=ylj&unstamped=1 |