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dc.contributor.authorLevine, Aaron M
dc.contributor.authorMacey, Joshua C.
dc.date2021-11-25T13:35:39.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T12:06:32Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T12:06:32Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierylj/vol127/iss5/4
dc.identifier.contextkey14373541
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/10328
dc.description.abstractAlmost eight years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, financial institutions remain large, complex, and interconnected. Academics and policymakers across the ideological spectrum largely agree that Dodd-Frank has imposed substantial compliance costs on systematically important financial institutions (SIFis) without solving the problem that they are too big to fail. This Note argues that Dodd-Frank's compliance costs have actually served an important regulatory purpose. By analyzing the spinoffs and divestitures that have occurred at eleven SIFis since Dodd-Frank went into effect in 2010, this Note documents the extent to which the Act's compliance costs have led SIFis to shed business lines of their own accord.
dc.titleDodd-Frank Is a Pigouvian Regulation
dc.source.journaltitleYale Law Journal
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T12:06:32Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylj/vol127/iss5/4
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9284&context=ylj&unstamped=1


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