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dc.contributor.authorMacey, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorHaddock, David
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:19.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:36:53Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:36:53Z
dc.date.issued1987-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/1774
dc.identifier.contextkey1775677
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/1030
dc.description.abstractCoase's pioneering observation that contracting parties, absent transactions costs, will reach a Pareto efficient allocation of property rights seems to have particular force when applied to the dilemma of insider trading. In this Article we seek to bring Coase's insight to bear on the insider trading debate: We consider what intrafirm rule shareholders would select if they could decide for themselves whether to permit their insiders to trade on information not yet reflected in the price of their firm's shares.
dc.titleA Coasian Model of Insider Trading
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:36:53Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1774
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2788&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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