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dc.contributor.authorMacey, Jonathan
dc.date2021-11-25T13:34:19.000
dc.date.accessioned2021-11-26T11:36:52Z
dc.date.available2021-11-26T11:36:52Z
dc.date.issued1984-01-01T00:00:00-08:00
dc.identifierfss_papers/1766
dc.identifier.contextkey1775740
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/1021
dc.description.abstractThis article examines and analyzes the Glass-Steagall Act (the Act), which separates commercial banking from investment banking and concludes that the most plausible explanation for the passage of the Act derives from a theory that recognizes the role of special interest groups in influencing legislative outcomes. It follows ineluctably from the application of this theory to the Glass-Steagall Act that judges, when called upon to interpret the Act, will face a virtually insurmountable burden due to the vast dichotomy between the ostensible legislative intent and the actual motivations of Congress.
dc.titleSpecial Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall
dc.source.journaltitleFaculty Scholarship Series
refterms.dateFOA2021-11-26T11:36:52Z
dc.identifier.legacycoverpagehttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1766
dc.identifier.legacyfulltexthttps://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2796&context=fss_papers&unstamped=1


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