Loading...
How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments More Effective
Melamed, A. Douglas Shapiro, Carl
Melamed, A. Douglas
Shapiro, Carl
Files
Abstract
Much attention has been paid in recent years to legal issues arising from standard setting, assertion of standard-essential patents, and the requirements imposed by standard-setting organizations that standard-essential patents be licensed on reasonable terms. This Feature argues that a fundamental aspect of the antitrust laws, heretofore overlooked in this context, can play an important role in ensuring that the rules established by standard-setting organizations are effective in preventing owners of standard-essential patents from engaging in patent holdup. It has long been a basic principle of antitrust law that when firms collaborate to engage in conduct that has efficiency benefits, like standard-setting, they violate the antitrust laws if their collaboration also harms competition more than necessary to obtain the efficiency benefits. Both standard-setting organizations and their members can violate Section of the Sherman Act if the organization's rules are ineffective in preventing owners of standard-essential patents from exploiting the monopoly power they gain as a result of the standard.