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Publication

Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks Properly

Roe, Mark J.
; 
Troge, Michael
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Yale Journal on Regulation
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Abstract
At the root of recurring bank crises are deeply-implanted incentives for banks and their executives to take systemically excessive risk. Since the 2008-2009 financial crisis, regulators have sought to strengthen the financial system by requiring more capital (which can absorb losses from risk-taking) and less risk-taking, principally via command-and-control rules. Yet bankers' baseline incentives for system-degrading risk-taking remain intact.
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http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/8262