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Statutory Structure
Bogue, Russell
Bogue, Russell
Abstract
One of the least controversial tools of statutory interpretation the Supreme Court
employs is also one of its least examined: the use of a statute’s “structure.” For decades—but particularly
under Chief Justice Roberts—the Court has determined the meaning of ambiguous statutory
provisions through reference to the “structure,” “scheme,” or “plan” of a statute. Despite its
ubiquity in the Court’s opinions, however, structural argument in statutory interpretation has
gone largely unexamined by scholars. This Note attempts to fill that gap.
Through an analysis of recent case law, this Note categorizes the types of structural argument
employed by the Court in its statutory-interpretation cases and the various assumptions needed
to motivate such arguments. This fine-grained mapping permits a closer normative evaluation of
structural argument and, in particular, of its compatibility with different methodologies of statutory
interpretation. All dominant methods for reading statutes have good reason—on their own
terms—to employ some types of structural argument, which demonstrates its cross-methodological
appeal. But purposive reasoning best embodies the assumptions of coherence and rational design
that undergird structuralism. The sway of this type of argument over a hypertextualist Supreme
Court thus suggests the enduring need for purposive reasoning, particularly as the
traditional tools of purposivism—such as legislative history—have been largely abandoned.