# Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom

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This study examines the effects of counterterrorism policing tactics on public cooperation among Muslim communities in London, U.K. The study reports results of a random-sample survey of 300 closed and fixed response telephone interviews conducted in Greater London's Muslim community in February and March 2010. It tests predictors of cooperation with police acting against terrorism. Specifically, the study provides a quantitative analysis of how perceptions of police efficacy, greater terrorism threat, and the perceived fairness of policing tactics ("procedural justice") predict the willingness to cooperate voluntarily in law enforcement efforts against terrorism. Cooperation is defined to have two elements: a willingness to work with the police in anti-terror efforts, and the willingness to alert police upon becoming aware of a terror-related risk in a community. We find that among British Muslims, both measures of cooperation are better predicted by procedural justice concerns than by perceptions of police efficacy or judgments about the severity of the terrorism threat. Unlike previous studies of policing in the United States, however, we find no correlation between cooperation and judgments about the legitimacy of police; rather, procedural justice judgments influence cooperation directly.

## I. Introduction

After terrorist attacks in New York, London, Glasgow, Madrid, and other major urban centers, police in the United States and Europe have been tasked with dual functions of crime control and terrorism prevention. Policing responses to the newly perceived terrorism threat have concentrated on Muslim communities of South Asian, Middle Eastern, and North African origin. These communities, on the one hand, have been subject to

more intensive and burdensome police scrutiny and intrusion. Law enforcement has, on the other hand, cultivated ties with Muslim communities to secure cooperation in obtaining information about potential terrorist recruitment and planning, and to overcome the cultural and linguistic differences that increase the cost to police of gathering information absent cooperation from members of linguistically and culturally distinct minority communities. Such cooperation has already proved important in preventing terrorism attempts (Schulhofer et al. 2011).

How do the choice of investigative tactics—and the perception of police as either effective or ineffective, and either discriminatory or fair—interact with public cooperation? This study addresses the relationship between counterterrorism policing tactics and public cooperation within Muslim communities in London, U.K. We report here the results of a random-sample survey of 300 closed and fixed response telephone interviews conducted in Greater London in February and March 2010 testing predictors of cooperation among the British Muslim community. This is the first study to examine empirically the dynamics of policing against terror in this important U.K. population. Specifically, the study provides a quantitative analysis of how different policing tactics correlate to different levels of willingness to cooperate voluntarily with police in efforts against terrorism. As discussed below, cooperation is defined in the study to have two forms: first, a general receptivity toward helping the police in anti-terror work and, second, a more specific willingness to alert police upon becoming aware of a terror-related risk in a community.

Drawing on these data, we evaluate three potential explanations for public cooperation by British Muslim communities with police. The first two mechanisms are derived from previous studies (largely conducted in the United States) of public cooperation with police in ordinary crime control efforts and of compliance with laws. First, studies have hypothesized an instrumental mechanism whereby people estimate and act on the basis of net expected benefits or costs from cooperation with the police (Becker 1976; Posner 1985). Second, other studies have identified "procedural justice" explanations for public cooperation with law enforcement. The procedural justice model posits a two-stage explanation: people respond to their belief that police are a legitimate authority, which in turn is a function of the fairness and procedural justice of police procedures in formulating and implementing policies (MacCoun 2005; Tyler 2006b; Tyler & Huo 2002). This study independently tests both components of this mechanism.

The third explanation for public cooperation—examined for the first time in this study—is political and religious ideologies. We use the term "ideology" to refer to normative judgments derived from systematic judgments about political systems (Kennedy 1979). Ideology so defined is a potentially relevant factor in this study because of the difference between ordinary crime and terrorism: terrorism is typically motivated by a political or religious critique of the government. Its use and its acceptance are potentially influenced by value-based judgments about the appropriateness of using violence toward innocent people to achieve political and religious objectives. Therefore, attitudes toward terrorism may also be motivated by allegiance to external political communities defined in either religious or political terms.

London is an appropriate locus of a study whose purpose is testing the strength of these explanations. It was the location of a major successful terrorist attack in July 2005.

There have been numerous arrests of British Muslims alleged to be connected to terrorist conspiracies (Pargeter 2008). Further, it has a substantial Muslim population. A 2001 census estimated that 8.5 percent of Londoners were Muslim (Mayor of London 2006).

On-the-ground policing has also changed in London in response to terrorist threats. The British parliament enacted omnibus anti-terrorism laws in 2001, 2005, 2006, and 2008, supplementing terrorism-related powers passed into law in 2000 (Mythen et al. 2009; Donohue 2008). These laws expanded police authority on the ground. Section 44 of the 2000 Terrorism Act, for example, vested police with controversial authority to engage in investigative street stops based on their discretionary risk judgments (Walker 2009). Counterterrorism intelligence officers have been installed at the borough level across London (Clarke 2007). The Home Office's Office for Security and Counter Terrorism also distributes to local police "heat maps" identifying areas of high risk for "producing violent extremists" (Turley 2009). New anti-terrorism policing powers in Britain have further led to allegations that police direct disproportionate resources toward Muslim and South Asian communities or otherwise engage in "profiling" (Chakraborti 2007; HCCLGC 2010; Kundnani 2009; Mirza et al. 2007; Travis 2010).

In summary, London is characterized by an arguably high terrorism threat level, by the deployment of new and potentially intrusive forms of policing, and by a religiously/ethnically diverse population in which a possible minority may hold sympathetic views about terrorism or negative evaluations of the police and the British government more generally. It therefore provides a plausible location in which to study competing explanations for public cooperation in anti-terrorism policing.

The article has six sections. The first explores the role of public cooperation in ordinary crime control and in counterterror policing. The second identifies different possible mechanisms for eliciting cooperation. The third section briefly reviews recent changes to terrorism-related policing in the United Kingdom and surveys existing research about their effect on British Muslim communities. The fourth outlines the methodology of the study and its limitations. The fifth presents the data. The final section discusses the results and draws implications for further study.

## II. Cooperation with Police

Cooperation between police and communities is almost uniformly viewed as good. Policing specialists and scholars have long recognized the value of cooperation in generating social order. The Metropolitan Police's founders stressed public cooperation (Reith 1956). More recently, studies from the United States suggest that policing strategies eliciting community cooperation have a potentially more significant effect on ordinary crime than strategies that do not involve the community (Bureau of Justice Assistance 1994; Hughes & Rowe 2007).

Is public cooperation as important to the success of policing against terror as it is to policing against ordinary crime? This is a question subject to continuing debate, but the weight of evidence suggests that cooperation is at least as valuable to the police in the counterterrorism context as in the crime control context, and is therefore worth studying.

In fact, it may be of greater value if law enforcement are more likely to be viewed as "outsiders" within the community being policed.

On the one hand, some policing experts emphasize a target-hardening approach to countering terrorism (Kelling & Bratton 2006). Drawing inspiration from what they characterize as an Israeli approach to counterterrorism policing, they argue for creation of a comprehensive "terrorist unfriendly" environment through cameras, random screenings, and sensors. Others use rational choice models to propose group-based sanctions against communities in which terrorists operate (Garoupa et al. 2006). These proposals implicitly discount the value of cooperation from the ethnic and religious communities generally targeted in terrorism investigations. This is the case because such "unfriendly" policies seem likely to undermine cooperation. For example, the fourth of Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne's nine articles on U.K. policing was: "To recognize always the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionally to the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives" (Reith 1956).

On the other hand, empirical evidence and police practice provide grounds for questioning a preference for harsh measures in counterterrorism policing (Schulhofer et al. 2011). First, empirical claims by advocates of various aggressive order-maintenance strategies have been subject to comprehensive criticism in the crime control context (Harcourt 2001; Zimring forthcoming). Second, although "very little is known about the nature and effectiveness of police counterterrorism strategies" (Lum et al. 2009), empirical evidence from analogous contexts suggests that counterterrorism strategies that depend on coercive measures have limited effects. LaFree et al., for example, estimate the deterrence effects and backlash effects of six policing and military interventions in the Northern Ireland context between 1969 and 1992 (LaFree et al. 2009). While their study does not directly address cooperation, it investigates the predictors of terrorist violence. Across the six interventions, LaFree et al. found a backlash effect in three cases—that is, that these interventions increased terrorist violence—deterrence effects in one case, and two interventions with no statistically significant impact. Their findings suggest that a deterrence-based model of harsh measures against terrorism can be counterproductive. Their result is supported by Berrebi and Klor's analysis of dynamic interactions between terrorism in the Israel-Palestine conflict and electoral outcomes, which identified no correlation between the use of more aggressive policies and reductions in the frequency of terrorism (Berrebi & Klor 2006).

Third, counterterrorism policing strategy in the United Kingdom has historically recognized the value of cultivating public cooperation within British Muslim communities. A "Muslim Contact Unit" has been formed in London for outreach to groups that otherwise would have little contact with the state (Lambert 2008). In 2007, Peter Clarke, then Deputy Assistant Commissioner for the Counter Terrorism Command of the Metropolitan Police and National Coordinator of Terrorist Investigations, stated: "One of the challenges for counter-terrorist policing is . . . not [to] lose our local connections within communities. We must include the flow of information coming from communities" (Clarke 2007).

Some empirical studies of terrorism predict that public cooperation will be especially valuable to counterterrorism policing. Terrorism is increasingly a dispersed and infrequent phenomenon. As relevant to U.S. and U.K. policymakers, it is increasingly the product of

fragmented and loosely conducted networks (Farrell 2011). It therefore poses a threat to a broad range of symbolic and real targets, typically using operatives with no prior record of terrorist activity. As a result of high levels of variance in tactics and targets, accurate and timely information to distinguish genuine threats from background noise has great value. The difficulty of identifying real risks in communities and cultures that are unfamiliar to the law enforcement community may mean that public cooperation is even more important than in the crime control context (Huq 2011). Post-2001 terrorist attempts have often involved individuals who developed connections with terrorist organizations and violent plans while living in European or Britain Muslim communities (Roy 2004; Sageman 2004, 2008). To the extent that terrorist groups seek either to recruit or hide within co-religionist communities, cooperation can provide information at lower cost and with fewer negative side effects than coercive or intrusive forms of intelligence gathering (Hasini et al. 2009).

It is therefore plausible that cooperation from Muslim communities in London or cities of its ilk is valuable in the case of counterterrorism just as public cooperation is valuable to ordinary crime control. Understanding the mechanisms by which such cooperation is either elicited or discouraged is therefore worthwhile.

## III.  Mechanisms of Public Cooperation with Police

The predictors of public cooperation with police in ordinary crime control efforts have been the subject of past study in the United States. We draw on those studies to identify potential mechanisms that could explain variance in cooperation within the population of British Muslims sampled in our study. Previous research suggests two principal mechanisms, one instrumental and the other normative. We further recognize that terrorism is importantly different from ordinary crime. Terrorism has an ideological dimension that ordinary crime typically does not. We therefore propose a third mechanism that reflects the ideological difference between crime and terrorism.

### A.  Instrumental Mechanisms

The first possible explanation for public cooperation with police is instrumental and grounded in a rational choice model of human decision making. In *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Bentham outlined an account of punishment as justified when expected cost outweighed expected benefits (Bentham 1996). This account implies that people cooperate with law enforcement in expectation of net gains from compliance— for example, increased safety—or of net losses from noncooperation—for example, increased unwelcome and burdensome attention from law enforcement (Becker 1976; Posner 1985). Police following the instrumental model encourage cooperative behavior by making community residents' cooperation more rewarding, for example, by showing that the police are effective in fighting crime (Kelling & Coles 1996), by punishing more rulebreakers (Bayley & Mendelsohn 1969; Nagin 1998), or by channeling unwelcome policing resources and attention toward uncooperative communities.

We focus on a simple instrumental model because it reflects an important strand in British policing. An instrumental approach to policing based on a simple rationale of deterrence dominated British policing policy through the 1980s (Hough 2007; Mclaughlin et al. 2001). In the 1990s, instrumental logic motivated the British government's model of "new public managerialism." This approach to policing emphasized tangible results, targets, league tables, costing, and the market testing of activities (McLaughlin et al. 2001). In a quintessentially instrumental approach to crime control, new public managerialism "pric[ed]" offenses to calibrate optimal sanctions (Garland 2001:130). It is therefore appropriate to ask whether a straightforward cost-benefit approach of this type explains public cooperation in the case of new efforts to combat terrorism.

## B. Procedural Justice Mechanisms

The second account of public cooperation with the police is based on ideas of procedural justice. This model has two elements. It first extrapolates from Max Weber's identification of legitimacy as a necessary antecedent of the state's preservation of social order (Tyler 2006a). Weber stipulated that the state possessed a monopoly on the use of force, but nevertheless contended that it could not preserve order through force alone. Legitimacy, Weber argued, provided the needed supplement (Weber 1968). A recent survey of the literature defines a legitimate authority as one "regarded by people as entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and followed by others" (Skogan & Frydl 2004:297).

The second element connects legitimacy to the procedural justice of police behavior. Research on legitimacy conducted within the United States shows that the legitimacy of an institution correlates with the extent to which it behaves with procedural justice (Sunshine & Tyler 2003a; Tyler 2006b). Procedural justice has two key elements: first, the quality of the process used to make decisions and, second, the quality of the interpersonal treatment that people receive when dealing with authorities (Tyler 2006b). The measurement of procedural justice therefore looks to several aspects of institutional behavior, including whether officials allow people to provide input before making decisions; whether officials exercise authority in neutral and consistent ways; whether they are perceived as trustworthy; and whether they treat people with whom they deal with dignity and respect (Tyler 2000, 2006b). In this study, we distinguish and address separately the legitimacy and procedural justice elements in this model.

Originally developed to model and explain variance in compliance with the law, the procedural justice model has been extended to *cooperation* with law enforcement entities (Sunshine & Tyler 2003a; Tyler & Fagan 2008). Procedural justice studies have further been extended to interactions between U.S. police and racial minorities (Sunshine & Tyler 2003a:532; Tyler 2005; Tyler & Fagan 2008; Tyler & Huo 2002). The model has also been replicated outside the United States (Tyler et al. 2000; Tyler 2007b; see also Tyler 2011). For example, one recent study found support for extra-legal law enforcement (vigilantism) in Ghana to be predicted by procedural justice but not by measures of police effectiveness (Tanekebe 2009). There is some evidence that procedural justice effects are not found in all non-U.S./European cultures. Studies conducted in China, for example, suggest that procedural justice effects are not found in work settings in that context (Brockner et al. 2001).

In the crime control context, the procedural justice account has been found to perform better than the instrumental model in predicting both compliance with the law and cooperation with law enforcement authorities. An extensive literature in the United States consistently finds correlations between procedural justice and legitimacy on the one hand, and between legitimacy and compliance with the law on the other (Tyler 2009). In respect to ordinary policing, empirical studies find, by contrast, only weak support for instrumental accounts of either cooperation with law enforcement or compliance with the law (Tyler 2006b, 2007a; Tyler & Fagan 2008; Sunshine & Tyler 2003a).

The procedural justice model has been extended in the United States to the counterterrorism context. In a study with a similar (but not identical) Muslim sample, Tyler et al. (2010) analyze the interaction between U.S. law enforcement and Muslim Americans in New York City. They find strong procedural justice effects on cooperation both when the latter is defined as willingness to work personally with the police and when it is defined as willingness to alert police of potentially suspicious behavior (Tyler et al. 2010). They further find that the effect of procedural justice is mediated through legitimacy, as has been the case in earlier procedural justice studies. By contrast, they find no statistically significant correlation between cooperation and the expected costs or benefits of counterterrorism efforts. This New York City study provides threshold ground for positing that models of public cooperation in the crime control context can be profitably transferred to the counterterrorism context.

The U.S. and the European contexts, however, are different in ways that might influence the dynamics of cooperation (Whitman 2003). Criminal justice procedures and institutions are not the same in the two continents, and the relationship between the Muslim population and dominant social institutions is also not the same. The United States is distinctive in its history of assimilating minority populations that in other countries continue to maintain separate traditions and loyalties across generations. Although U.S. and British Muslims migrant communities share common South Asian and Arab origins, the two states' approaches to the economic and social integration of migrant populations also diverge dramatically along several axes (Brown 2006; Shukla 2003). One potential effect of divergent approaches to migration may be varying rates of identification with the nation-state. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that a result generated in the U.S. context will be generalizable to a European context.

## C. Ideological Mechanisms

The present study also allows a third set of hypotheses to be tested. This third model focuses on ideology and suggests that individuals will be less willing to cooperate with police against terrorism when they have increasingly positive assessments of either the political causes espoused by terrorists or the religious justifications invoked by terrorist organizations for violence against civilians. In this sense, terrorism is a recent manifestation of a long history of conflicts between the state and people motivated by religious values (Kelman & Hamilton 1989) or alternative political ideologies (Klandermans 1997). We call these "ideological" explanations for cooperation. They predict that noncooperation will be

linked to either an acceptance of the general normative framework or the specific political goals offered by terrorists.

The most significant terrorist organization for the purpose of this study is al Qaeda. Its claims are based on appeals to religious solidarity and to shared opposition to U.S., British, or European foreign policies (Habeck 2007; Kepel & Milelli 2010). Among al Qaeda's recruitment tools is online literature espousing the Salafist strand of Islamic thought (Cronin 2010:173). Al Qaeda literature also emphasizes disagreement with foreign policy decisions by U.S. and European governments with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, decisions widely opposed in some self-identified Muslim communities (Kepel 2004; Roy 2008:156–57). Domestic policy disagreements also figure in al Qaeda's arguments (Mamdani 2005). In a 2004 "Message to the American People," for example, Osama bin Laden critically invoked the "despotism and contempt for freedom [of] the Patriot Act" (Kepel & Milelli 2010:74). Both political and religious differences, therefore, are potentially relevant for predicting attitudes toward the legitimacy of terrorism. Because of their relevance, they may shape cooperation against terrorism differently than attitudes to ordinary crime (for a direct comparison using U.S. data, see Huq et al. forthcoming).

In labeling these explanations "ideological," we follow the terminology of the U.K. government. In the 2010 statement of national counterterrorism policy, that government identified the "ideology that supports violent extremism" as a key source of terrorist risk (HM Government 2010:12). Counterterrorism strategy in Britain addresses this ideology through tactics that focus on responding to political and religious arguments. The U.K. government has initiated debates on both political and religious matters to counteract al Qaeda recruitment efforts. Part of the British government's "prevent" strategy, for example, was the funding of "prominent domestic and international Islamic scholars" to promote a "Radical Middle Way," and effort by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office "to take part in discussions with British Muslims on foreign policy issues of concern (HM Government 2009:14–18). These efforts have been controversial. They are criticized as favoring more religious Muslims over more secular ones, and disadvantaging non-Muslim South Asians and Caribbean groups (HCCLGC 2010). There is little empirical evidence, however, on their implicit assumption that ideology is a reliable predictor of attitudes to terrorism.

"Ideology" encompasses several elements. It is necessary to be more precise in order to operationalize it for the purposes of this study. Ideological explanations generate three possible hypotheses concerning cooperation relevant to this study. First, cooperation may be correlated with views on foreign policy decisions that al Qaeda focuses on, such as the Middle East conflict, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. Second, cooperation may be correlated with acceptance of the means used by terrorists. In particular, terrorism involves the willingness to kill people at best marginally linked to the policies terrorists oppose and most properly considered to be innocent bystanders. Third, cooperation may decline with increased religious (in this context specifically Muslim) identity because of feelings of solidarity with the culture from which most of the relevant terrorists emerge and whose imagery and values are invoked by terrorists to explain and justify their actions. The questionnaire used in this study allows us to test each of these three hypotheses.

## IV. The Context of Policing Against Terrorism in the United Kingdom

This section summarizes past empirical research into the policing of British Muslim communities. Past studies, however, provide few data about the relative strength of possible explanations for cooperation in counterterrorism policing. They do suggest, however, that the population that this study focuses on should contain a diversity of views about the efficacy and fairness of police and a range of normative judgments about the British state and terrorism.

Large Muslim populations have resided in the United Kingdom since the 1960s (Ansari 2004). The 2001 National Census found 1.6 million Muslims; 68 percent were of South Asian ethnicity (Choudhury et al. 2005; Fetzer & Soper 2005). (In the United States, in contrast, a Muslim population roughly similar in absolute numbers (approximately 1–2 million) is embedded within a national population about five times as large.) Studies of British Muslims suggest a variety of normative judgments about terrorism and the British state. Through a telephone survey of 1,003 Muslims sampled from the United Kingdom, Mirza et al. identify intergenerational increases in reported religiosity but little support for terrorist organizations. They report that 7 percent of respondents in their sample "admire organizations like Al-Qaeda" (Mirza et al. 2007). By contrast, a Gallup study based on a probability sample of London Muslims in late 2006 and early 2007 found Muslims in their sample as likely as members of the general public to condemn terrorist attacks on civilians and slightly more likely than the general public (81 percent vs. 72 percent) to find no moral justification for the use of violence in a "noble cause" (Mogahed 2007). These studies may suggest that at least some subset of U.K. Muslims maintain ideological postures that are supportive of terrorism as a means, but they do not directly examine the impact of religious ideologies on cooperation with the police.

British Muslims also appear to have divergent judgments about the procedural justice and efficacy of the police. Muslim civil society groups argue that new policing powers created since 2000 are used in discriminatory ways based on religious identity or in ways that exacerbate private violence against Muslims (Birt 2006; Chakrabarti 2007; HCCLGC 2010; Kundnani 2009). Robust empirical study of the consequences of the interaction between police and minority communities, however, has been in short supply. Mythen et al. conducted focus groups with 32 British Pakistanis aged 18–26 in northwest England and identified concerns about racial victimization and "excessive police stop searching" (Mythen et al. 2009). Based on field interviews, Haberfeld et al. also report confusion about the division of authority between local police and the security services in counterterrorism and a "disconnect between the law enforcement and the community" (Haberfeld et al. 2009:57). By contrast, an 11-city European survey, including the English city of Leicester and the London borough of Waltham Forest, found no difference in the level of trust in police among Muslims and non-Muslims (Open Society Institute 2010:169–70). Drawing on focus groups conducted in conjunction with an 11-city survey of Muslims in Europe, that study posited that trust in the police is high among European Muslims because of favorable comparisons between European police and police in the relevant country of emigration (Open Society Institute 2010:172; see also Loader & Mulcahy 2003:162).

To summarize, past studies of British Muslims identify a population with an internal diversity of normative judgments about both terrorism and the British police. No previous study, however, has attempted to estimate the relationships between, on the one hand, those judgments about the police and about terrorism and, on the other hand, cooperation with police that may mitigate the risk of terrorism events occurring (for related but distinct studies in the Israeli context, see Jonathan 2010; Weisburd et al. 2010). This study exploits these relationships with the aim of identifying predictors of public cooperation with police in addressing terrorism.

# V. Method

## A. Survey Methodology

This cross-sectional study of Muslims in London was conducted in two stages. The first stage was designed to gather information concerning British Muslims' interactions with police in regard to terrorism. A snowball sample of 100 nonquantitative open-ended interviews was conducted with British Muslims in London. Interviewers were recruited through advertising in undergraduate and graduate faculties in Greater London. Data gathered through this nonrandom sample were used to inform the survey design at the second stage. For example, the open-ended survey was used to gather information about what members of the London Muslim community believed police to be doing to address terrorism, the kind of foreign policy disputes that people believed most salient, and the distribution of contacts with law enforcement. These data were used in the design of a survey instrument for the second-stage randomly sampled part of the study. Those data also include material that can be used in the interpretation of quantitative data from the second stage.

In the second stage of the study, we conducted extended closed-ended interviews with a random sample of 300 individuals drawn from the population of Muslims residing in Greater London. This part of the study was conducted by the survey research firm SRBI and its London-based affiliate Ethnic Focus. The respondents were identified though the following random-walk method. London boroughs were divided into three strata according to the proportion of population recorded as Muslim in the 2001 census. Within each of these strata, boroughs were randomly drawn from a distribution weighted according to each one's concentration of the aggregate London Muslim population. Within each borough, one ward was randomly selected. Equal numbers of interviews were conducted in each ward. Within each ward, a random-walk method was used to identify respondents. Beginning at a designated random starting point, interviewers followed a random-route protocol to identify doors on which to knock. Noncontacted residences were revisited twice on different days, at evenings, and at weekends. Interviewers spoke English, Urdu, Arabic, and Bengali. During the face-to-face contact, the interviewer described the study and obtained cooperation from the respondent. They were then called back and interviewed over the telephone. This procedure was used to allay suspicion about the purposes of the study and to secure higher levels of cooperation

from respondents. In addition, a stratified sampling methodology was used to produce demographic variance along gender and age dimensions.

The procedure led to a high overall response rate of 81 percent using APPOR standard response rate definition three (a parallel study conducted in the United States with solely telephone contact and interviews obtained a response rate of 47 percent; see Tyler et al. 2010). Ninety percent of the interviews were conducted in English; 3 percent in Arabic; 5 percent in Urdu; and 2 percent in Bengali.

Questions were drawn from two sources. First, previous studies of policing and legitimacy have developed questions to elicit views on deterrence and legitimacy (Tyler 2006b; Tyler & Fagan 2008), procedural justice (Tyler & Fagan 2008), and measures used in counterterrorism policing by Tyler et al. (2010). Second, the qualitative pretest was used in the design of the telephone survey instrument.

Three methodological issues are of potential importance. First, there is a question as to whether the sample was comprised of respondents who were more likely than the average Muslim to speak to a survey researcher and, by extension, more inclined to cooperate with police. We believe that this kind of sampling bias is unlikely given that the response rate for the survey of 81 percent using APPOR standard response rate definition three is reasonably high. The fact that it was a small proportion of individuals approached who declined to respond—the result of the random-walk method of contacting respondents—makes it unlikely that the data suffer from a bias of this kind. On the contrary, the fact that respondents were initially approached in person and asked to cooperate in the study likely led the sample to be especially representative relative to typical telephone surveys.

Second, and relatedly, respondents might be expected to dampen expression of views that they anticipate would be disfavored by authorities. Again, the risk of such bias is minimized by the random-walk method and the high response rate. This study also exploits covariance in the sample data, not absolute behavioral metrics, which mitigates this concern. Finally, observed variance in the sample of responses to questions about the likelihood of reporting risk behaviors possibly tied to terrorism further mitigates this dampening concern.

Third, respondents were asked about whether they would engage in various forms of cooperation in the future; we report this below as data on "cooperation." We gathered no data, however, on what respondents would do if in fact presented with a situation in which cooperation with police was a possibility. To some extent such behavior is by definition unobservable. There is no simple way to know that someone could have cooperated but decided not to do so. Further, resource and ethical constraints make it infeasible to observe directly how respondents react to occasions for cooperation in practice. The incidence of terrorism is not high enough to be able to secure statistically significant data without very large samples. Obvious ethical concerns arise in simulating terrorism risks to test experimentally respondents' reactions. Information on expected cooperation is therefore the best data available. It is encouraging, moreover, that other studies have compared "self-reported" cooperation rates with independently observed behavior and found high levels of convergence (Blader & Tyler 2009; Tyler et al. 2007) and that people's statements about their intentions to act are widely found to predict their subsequent behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980).

*B. Demographics*

The mean age of the sample is 35 and 50 percent are male. The sample is diverse in terms of both income and education. For income, 28 percent have an annual income of under £20,000; 30 percent between £20,000 and £30,000; 24 percent between £30,000 and £40,000; 14 percent between £40,000 and £50,000; and 5 percent over £50,000. With respect to education, 17 percent had some schooling; 25 percent had completed secondary education; 21 percent had spent some time at university; 29 percent had completed a first university degree; and 8 percent some postgraduate or further professional education.

The sample frame for this study is British Muslims residing in London, and not Muslims nationally. The demographic profile of British Muslims nationally diverges from the London sample. According to data from the U.K. Office of National Statistics (UKONS), Muslims in 2001 comprised 2.8 percent of the national population and 52 percent of these were male. At that time, 70.97 percent of the Muslim population was under 34 years of age. While the UKONS does not report income data, in 2004, Muslims had the highest unemployment rate of any religious group (13 percent). With respect to education, UKONS reports that as of 2004, 13.1 percent of Muslims born in the United Kingdom had no educational qualifications, 3.9 percent had some higher education, and 15 percent had completed one higher degree. Of Muslims born outside the United Kingdom, 31.3 percent had no educational qualifications, 2.7 percent had some higher education, and 8.5 percent had completed one higher degree (UKONS 2004).

*C. Measures*

This section describes the questions in the survey instruments and, as relevant, the scales used in the analysis. The Appendix provides a more detailed description of the questions used to construct each scale used in this analysis. Respondents were asked a series of closed-ended questions concerning their beliefs about and experiences of policing against terrorism, the British state and its relationship to British Muslims, and the legitimacy of the means and ends of terrorism. A majority of questions elicited answers on a four-point scale. Responses were combined to form scales to provide measures of both dependent and independent variables. Each of the dependent variables concerning cooperation with police in various forms is also measured on a four-point scale. Legitimacy, by contrast, is measured on a five-point scale.

The study is focused on two dependent variables that measure different forms of cooperation with the police. The first measured personal cooperation with the police in respect to counterterrorism (WORK WITH THE POLICE). This is based on questions concerning respondents' willingness to attend voluntary interviews or meetings called by the police. The second measured willingness to report different potentially suspicious behaviors (ALERT THE POLICE). We asked respondents whether they would contact police if they learned of specific risk indicators, for example, a neighbor constructing a bomb, visiting "radical" websites, or distributing al Qaeda literature. To control for differences in respondents' prior views about the seriousness of a terror-related behavior, we weighted likelihood of alerting by the respondent's perception of an incident's seriousness. In this

weighting, respondents were given greater weight for a stronger willingness to report terror threats that they judged to be especially serious.

The instrumental model was tested primarily through two variables that measured, on the one hand, the perceived seriousness of the terrorism threat and, on the other hand, the effectiveness of police in addressing that threat. To test an alternative form of instrumental explanation, we also asked respondents whether they cooperated to avoid retaliation from the police.

The procedural justice model, as developed in previous studies, requires data on both judgments of legitimacy and procedural justice. We sought both kinds of data from respondents and report both below. In line with previous studies, two sets of questions measuring procedural justice were used. One set of questions looked at procedural justice in the process of policy formation. The other examined procedural justice in policy implementation. To measure legitimacy, we asked respondents about two kinds of judgments. First, we asked about their feeling of obligation to obey the law and to defer to decisions made by legal authorities independent of sanction risks and experiences with punishment (LEGITIMACY). Second, we measured identification with the police based on shared moral values. To do this, we used a scale of moral legitimacy that was constructed on the basis of questions about the overlap in "values" between the respondent and the police (LEGITIMACY-MORAL). We did so because it has been suggested that moral identification is important to police legitimacy in the United Kingdom (Jackson & Bradford 2009; see also Sunshine & Tyler 2003b).

To measure ideology, we asked a series of questions to elicit respondents' views on three general questions. First, we identified foreign policy questions mentioned in the literature of terrorist organizations (Kepel & Milelli 2010), and sought views about those political questions. Second, we sought information about respondents' views about terrorism as a political strategy. Third, we obtained information about the strength of religious identification.

In addition to examining which of the three proposed mechanisms best explains either form of cooperation with police, the survey instrument allowed a disaggregation and analysis of different policing tactics. This enables more granular analysis of the interaction between policing choices and policed populations. Using exploratory factor analysis, we constructed three scales based on questions about respondents' perceptions of the frequency of different kinds of policing tactics. First, a scale was constructed that measured how frequently police are perceived to engage in intrusive measures without any reference to group identity, for example, searching people on public transport or questioning people at their homes (PERSON TARGETED). This measure is intended to identify the perceived incidence of policing tactics that simply single out and burden individuals. Second, a scale was constructed that aggregated measures of how much police are perceived as targeting based on ethnicity or religion, in other words, against the respondents' own community (COMMUNITY TARGETED). This measure is intended to measure the perceived incidence of measures targeting groups qua groups. The third measure focused on the distinct concept of harassment, and builds on questions about perceptions of whether police threaten the use of excessive force against members of a respondent's community (HARASS). More details of all these scales are contained in the Appendix.

# VI. Results

## A. Descriptive Statistics

We begin by presenting descriptive statistics relevant to the two main dependent variables tested (specific and general cooperation). The response distribution of the independent variables is reported in the Appendix. The descriptive data respecting both dependent and independent variables suggest that the sample drawn has sufficient internal variation to enable examination of the causes of both forms of cooperation. The descriptive data reported in the Appendix also suggest that the sample has internal variance respecting all the independent variables of interest on one or more questions. In the case of "instrumental" variables, for example, a high proportion of the respondents do not believe the risk of terrorist violence in the United Kingdom to be large. In light of the historical record of attacks and attempted attacks since 2005, this is a perhaps surprising result. The sample was more evenly split on judgments of police efficacy. The sample also splits roughly evenly when evaluating the fairness of police behavior, but a majority (82 percent) is inclined to view the police as a legitimate body whose decisions warrant deference.

Respecting ideological mechanisms, the data suggest that political opposition to the policies of the U.K. government is very strong among British Muslims in London. More than 95 percent of respondents disagree with the use of force in Afghanistan and the U.S. decision to create a prison in Guantánamo Bay, while 70 percent disagree with the invasion of Iraq. Almost all (98 percent) disagree with support for Israel. By contrast, support for terrorism varies. Most respondents support the suggestion that terrorists have some valid grievances and many support terrorism itself, particularly for religious reasons. Finally, respondents reported strong identification with being Muslim and supported the idea of maintaining a separate culture. The sample population thus generally identifies as religious. While the links between ideology and terrorism are empirically contested, this population nevertheless does seem to provide a context to test the influence of various forms of ideology on cooperation with the police against terrorism.

Tables 1 and 2 turn to the dependent variables of interest—the two forms of cooperation. We first present descriptive data showing the distribution of attitudes toward both general forms of cooperation with the police and the willingness to report specific risky behaviors.

Table 1:   Descriptive Statistics: Measures of Willingness to Work with Law Enforcement

| Cooperation | Very/Somewhat Unlikely | Very/Somewhat Likely |
|---|---|---|
| Work with the police to educate people in your community about the dangers of terrorism. | 52% | 48% |
| Volunteer time on nights or weekends to help patrol areas of your neighborhood. | 77% | 23% |
| Encourage members of your community to cooperate with the police. | 36% | 64% |

NOTE: Data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London (conducted February–March 2010).

Table 2:   Descriptive Statistics: Measures of Willingness to Alert Law Enforcement

| | Concerned? | | Alert Police? | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Circumstances Observed | Not at All/Not Very | Somewhat/Very | Unlikely | Likely |
| A person saying he/she had joined a group you consider politically radical. | 58% | 42% | 63% | 37% |
| A person withdrawing from a mosque without any explanation. | 65% | 35% | 80% | 20% |
| A person overheard discussing their decision to help plant explosives in a terrorist attack. | 0% | 100% | 14% | 86% |
| A person visiting Internet chat rooms in which material supporting al Qaeda is presented. | 9% | 91% | 43% | 57% |
| A person reading extremist religious literature. | 43% | 57% | 73% | 27% |
| A person giving money to organizations that people say are associated with terrorists. | 32% | 68% | 57% | 43% |
| A person talking about traveling overseas to fight for Muslims. | 46% | 54% | 69% | 31% |
| A person distributing material expressing support for al Qaeda. | 29% | 71% | 45% | 55% |

NOTE:  Data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London (conducted February–March 2010).

Just as it is difficult to determine when ideology matters to the production of terror-ism, so, too, it is difficult to say what level of cooperation is adequate and what level insufficient to maintain public order. More cooperation generally might be seen as better. However, such cooperation will correlate to what the respondent views as legitimate police concerns, that is, people will not report behavior that they do not feel should be a police matter. Table 1 indicates that a majority of the sample (64 percent) are willing to volunteer and work with police. Table 2 presents the data on willingness to alert the police. It shows that respondents clearly do not view all types of potentially risky behavior as equally warranting concern. It also demonstrates that there is a gap between what concerns respon-dents and what they are willing to report to police. The most dramatic example of this gap arises in the responses given to questions that concern knowing about a plan to plant explosives in some building. In that case, 100 percent of respondents indicate that this is a fact warranting concern. However, only 86 percent say that they would report the issue to the police. On another question, 35 percent of respondents indicate that someone with-drawing from a mosque would be a cause for concern but only 20 percent would report it to the police. Hence, there is clearly some degree of reluctance to involve the police even when an issue might be evaluated as a legitimate matter of concern.

B.  What Factors Predict Cooperation with the Police Within the Sampled Population of British Muslims?

We turn next to the question of what best predicts the likelihood that members of the sampled population of British Muslims will state an intention to cooperate with the police. We address this question by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the

Table 3:   Predictors of Specific and General Cooperation: A Simple Specification

|  | *Work with the Police* | *Alert the Police* |
|---|---|---|
| Demographics | 0% | 0% |
| Instrumental concerns | 4%** | 3%* |
| Procedural justice alone | 19%*** | 17%*** |
| Legitimacy alone | 5%*** | 4%*** |
| Ideology | 3%* | 1% |
| Religion | 6%*** | 0% |
| Overall adjusted $R^2$ | 19%*** | 13%*** |

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

NOTE: The numbers in each case reflect the percentage of the variance explained by the cluster of variables considered together. The overall adjusted $R^2$ is the amount of variance explained by all variables. Demographics include age, education, income, and gender. Instrumental concerns include whether terror is serious, whether the police are effective, and whether respondents fear retaliation. Ideology includes the acceptability of terrorism, views about government policy, and identification. Religion includes religious identification and practices and views about whether society respects and/or discriminates against Muslims. The overall percentage of variance in the case of alert is higher for procedural justice alone (17 percent) than for all the variables (13 percent). This happens because the results are adjusted for the number of independent variables in the equation and in the case of alerting the police there are many nonsignificant predictors in the overall equation.

SOURCE: OLS regression of data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London (conducted February–March 2010).

relationship between the two dependent variables of interest—willingness to work with police to fight terror and willingness to alert the police to potentially threatening conduct—and measures of the hypothesized instrumental, normative, and ideological mechanisms. We present several regression specifications in order to illustrate findings about the three hypothesized mechanisms.

Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis in which the independent variables are entered as groups of variables. Those groups reflect six potential types of predictors of cooperation: demographics, instrumental concerns, procedural justice, legitimacy, ideology, and religiosity. Because variables within a cluster are correlated, representing them as distinct indices may underrepresent their true influence. By including the variables within a single group and looking at the overall amount of variance explained, that problem is removed. The dependent variables are the two forms of cooperation in fighting terrorism defined above. In each case, the analysis indicates how much variance in the dependent variable is explained by the indices of one particular type without considering any other factors. This parsimonious specification does not take account of any covariation among variables reflecting different categories.

Most importantly, Table 3 suggests that the normative mechanism represented by procedural justice dominates both the instrumental mechanism and the various ideological mechanisms. This is so with respect to both forms of cooperation. For example, 17 percent of the variance in willingness to alert the police is explained by procedural justice. In the case of the "working with the police" aspect of cooperation, procedural justice explains 19 percent of the variance. The data also suggest that legitimacy adds little to what is explained by procedural justice when considered alone.

Table 4 presents a more complex and comprehensive OLS regression specification. Again, the dependent variables are general and specific cooperation. In this specification,

Table 4: OLS Regression of Indexes of Instrumental, Normative, and Ideological Mechanisms on Two Forms of Cooperation

| | Work with the Police | | Alert the Police | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legitimacy | 0.22** | — | 0.25** | — |
| *Procedural Justice* | | | | |
| Policy formation | — | 0.20*** | — | 0.15* |
| Policy implementation | — | 0.28*** | — | 0.36*** |
| *Ideology* | | | | |
| Terrorism is moral | −0.20* | 0.12 | −0.20* | 0.08 |
| Terrorism is politically acceptable | −0.15* | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.06 |
| Evaluation of government policy | −0.12 | −0.06 | 0.00 | −0.05 |
| Muslim identification | −0.07 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| U.K. identification | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Muslims should keep separate | −0.10 | −0.06 | 0.01 | 0.04 |
| *Instrumental Factors* | | | | |
| Terror is serious | −0.11 | −0.09 | 0.05 | 0.01 |
| Police are effective | −0.04 | −0.02 | 0.06 | 0.01 |
| Cooperation to avoid retaliation | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 0.06 |
| *Religion* | | | | |
| I am religious | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.09 |
| People respect Muslims | −0.13 | −0.09 | −0.03 | 0.04 |
| I have changed my religious practices | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Society discriminates against Muslims | −0.12 | 0.06 | −0.06 | −0.09 |
| *Demographics* | | | | |
| Age | −0.06 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Education | 0.09 | 0.07 | −0.02 | −0.06 |
| Income | −0.08 | −0.02 | −0.03 | 0.06 |
| Gender | 0.01 | −0.06 | 0.11 | 0.05 |
| Total adjusted $R^2$ | 13% | 19% | 6% | 13% |

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

NOTES: Table 4 has four columns because within each dependent variable there are two equations. The first two involve working with the police, while the third and fourth are concerned with alerting the police on the influence of the two measures of procedural justice. The coefficients shown are the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights).

SOURCE: OLS regression of data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London (conducted February–March 2010).

more independent variables have been added to reflect different elements of each cluster (both specifications include demographics). All the independent variables used in the model are listed in Table 4; they are also defined, along with details of the relevant indices, in the Appendix. Although this more complex specification allows for more precise estimation of the effects of different mechanisms, it also presents a greater risk of multicollinearity. Comparison of Table 3 to Table 4, however, allows us to identify possible multicollinearity problems. The similarity of the findings across Tables 3 and 4 suggests that there are not strong multicollinearity issues in these data. If there were, the importance of a cluster when considered alone would differ from its importance when considered in an overall regression equation. A comparison of the two tables indicates that this does not happen.

Table 5:   Step-Wise Analysis of Factors Shaping Cooperation

|  | *1* | *2* | *3* | *4* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Demographics | x | x | x | x |
| Instrumental variables |  | x | x | x |
| Ideology and religion |  |  | x | x |
| Procedural justice/legitimacy |  |  |  | x |
| Total adjusted $R^2$ | 0% | 3% | 6% | 22% |

NOTES: Stepwise OLS regression of data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London (conducted February–March 2010). The dependent variable is a combined measure of the two forms of cooperation.

The results shown in Table 4 are standardized regression coefficients for an equation in which all variables are considered simultaneously.[1] Table 4 indicates that both willingness to work with the police and willingness to alert the police are centrally influenced by procedural justice judgments. Both the fairness of the procedure by which government forms anti-terror policing policies and the fairness of the procedures through which such polices are implemented shape cooperation. Instrumental factors appear to have no significant effect on cooperation. There is no evidence that cooperation is induced through a fear of police retribution. As before, these findings also do not support the argument that people's ideologies—whether conceived in terms of political judgments, views about terrorism, or religiosity—shape their attitudes toward the police or the likelihood that they will cooperate with police in various ways. Ideology is generally irrelevant, except for a weak effect from the belief that terrorism is moral. Background factors, including religion, have no effect. The normative mechanism again emerges as the best explanation for cooperation in the population being studied.

To check the robustness of these findings, we used a step-wise regression procedure to analyze the data.[2] Table 5 presents the results of the step-wise regression procedure. The numbers reported are the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights). They confirm the link between procedural justice and cooperation through the use of the stepwise regression procedure. Table 5 also provides a sharper focus on procedural justice. It indicates that once procedural justice is included, neither ideology nor religion contribute additional variance. Hence, this analysis reinforces the conclusion that procedural justice is the key antecedent of cooperation.

One further point is worth making here. Two aspects of procedural justice were tested by the survey instrument: policy creation and policy implementation. The findings presented in Table 4 indicate that in this U.K. sample, policy fairness in implementation is the central focus of concern. Respondents react less strongly to whether or not the

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[1]Because the dependent variables are scale scores, ordinary least squares regression was used for the analysis. However, the analysis was also conducted using ordinal logistic regression. Similar results were obtained using that method.

[2]In running these regressions, we also checked for multicollinearity by examining the intercorrelation matrix of the variables. Unreasonably high levels of multicollinearity were not found.

*Figure 1:*  Summary path analysis.



Full causal model.

NOTE:  Path analysis of data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London.

government involves them in the creation of policies for dealing with terrorism. This is especially the case with the willingness to alert the police to terror risks, where the beta for policy formation is 0.15 ($p < 0.05$) and for policy implementation 0.36 ($p < 0.001$). While the fairness of policy implementation dominates, fairness in policy formation is still separately somewhat important with respect to both forms of cooperation.

Finally, Figure 1 summarizes the entire model. The model fit the data well (CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04; chi-square (7) = 10.1). This figure directly addresses the role of legitimacy. It suggests that legitimacy does not directly shape cooperation behavior. Instead, procedural justice directly shapes behavior and also influences legitimacy.

As has been noted, prior studies of procedural justice typically find that procedural justice influences on cooperation are mediated by legitimacy. In this study of a British Muslim population, however, the influence of procedural justice on cooperation is direct and legitimacy is not found generally to mediate the relationship between procedural justice and cooperation. That finding is reinforced by the overall model shown in Figure 1.

## C.  The Procedural Justice-Legitimacy Gap

The gap between procedural justice and legitimacy, as discussed below, is a result that has not been observed in other studies. It is therefore appropriate to consider further whether there is a way to understand that result better based on these data. One way to interpret it

is to focus on the perceived place of Muslims within British society and culture as a consequence of policies respecting the treatment and integration of migrant groups. British Muslims and their U.S. counterparts are part of the same post World War II migrant diasporas, but have been subject to different strategies of immigration and assimilation (Brown 2006; Shukla 2003). The U.S. cohort is more recently arrived (by almost a full generation), having assumed substantial numbers only after the change in the U.S. immigration quota system that took effect in the 1960s and gradually began to make its impact felt thereafter. The procedural justice-legitimacy gap identified in this study may point to a downstream effect of those different immigration/integration/assimilation strategies. British Muslims, the data suggest, may stand *in* British society but not feel *of* British society. The contrast with the parallel New York study suggests that they stand in this regard on different ground from U.S. counterparts, who see themselves both *in* and *of* their society. So, for example, in this study, identification with the United Kingdom does not predict cooperation, while in the parallel U.S. sample, identification with the United States strongly predicts cooperation.

This hypothesis is consistent with earlier studies of procedural justice effects. Those who identify with the overall society see themselves as having obligations to the state (Sunshine & Tyler 2003b; Huo 2003; Huo et al. 1996; Smith & Tyler 1996). They therefore respond to the way the state behaves—and in the process form long-term normative assessments of the state. The relationship of British Muslims to the state, by contrast, may be more contingent. Goodwill may be more strongly linked to personal connections and individual-level treatment by authorities. Levels of compliance and cooperation with police may also vary more, depending on experiences with state authority. The hypothesis bears further investigation, not merely as part of the procedural justice model, but also as part of an effort to understand the long-term effects of different migration and assimilation strategies.

To test this explanation in a preliminary fashion, respondents were divided into two groups based on their level of identification with the United Kingdom. We predicted that the traditional connection between legitimacy and cooperation would be found among those high in identification with the United Kingdom. The results, presented in Table 6, support this prediction. Among those high in identification, legitimacy significantly

Table 6:   The Factors Shaping Cooperation Among Those High and Low in Identification with the United Kingdom

|  | *Level of Identification with the U.K.* | |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Low ($n = 128$)<br>Cooperate | High ($n = 168$)<br>Cooperate |
| Legitimacy | 0.18 | 0.28* |

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

NOTES: The coefficients shown are the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights). Entries shown are standardized regression coefficients from an equation in which all of the other factors shown in Table 4 were included as controls.

SOURCE: OLS regression of data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London (conducted February–March 2010).

influences cooperation. Among those low in identification, it does not. Belief in the legitimacy of the state, therefore, is stronger among those who have a sense of connection to the state and to society.

### D. What is the Impact of Changing Police Behavior?

The centrality of procedural justice draws attention to the importance of identifying which policing measures most strongly influence perceptions of procedural justice. How the choice of tactics by police influences procedural justice judgments is clearly a salient question. The survey instrument allows for some further examination of that question. It included questions on respondents' beliefs about the frequency of different kinds of policing tactics. Table 7 therefore presents an exploratory factor analysis of the police behavior data.

This analysis suggests that respondents respond differently to three distinct types of police behavior. One is behavior targeted toward the Muslim community. Another involves actions targeting particular individuals. And the third involves harassment of Muslims.

Regression analysis was used to examine the influence of police actions on judgments about police performance and the procedural justice of the police. The results of that analysis are shown in Table 8.

The results presented in Table 8 suggest that targeting *individuals* is evaluated as fair, while targeting *communities* is regarded as being illegitimate and unfair. Further, harassment of members of the same community is viewed as illegitimate and unfair. Hence, members of the Muslim community clearly recognize and accept a role for the intrusion of legal authorities into their community but react negatively to actions viewed as directed at the community, not actions viewed as directed at individuals, and have unfavorable views of harassment.

Table 7:   Factor Analysis of Police Behaviors

|  | Community | Person | Harass |
|---|---|---|---|
| Single out people to stop based on ethnicity. | 0.57 | — | — |
| Single out people at immigration and airports based on ethnicity. | 0.59 | — | — |
| Conduct electronic surveillance of mosques. | 0.55 | — | — |
| Listen to telephone calls or read e-mails from your community. | 0.59 | — | — |
| Trace money contributed to Islamic charities. | 0.76 | — | — |
| Put people from the Muslim community on trial. | 0.70 | — | — |
| Conduct raids of people in the Muslim community. | 0.72 | — | — |
| Search people on trains or on the underground. | — | 0.75 | — |
| Come to people's homes and ask questions. | — | 0.77 | — |
| Use informants to identify people in mosques. | — | 0.71 | — |
| Are especially suspicious of Muslims. | — | — | 0.48 |
| Use too much force when dealing with Muslims. | — | — | 0.56 |
| Threaten Muslims with physical harm. | — | — | .83 |
| Threaten to arrest or deport Muslims. | — | — | 0.77 |

SOURCE:  Data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London.

Table 8: The Impact of Police Behavior on Respondents' Evaluations of Police Performance and Procedural Justice

| | Police Performance | Procedural Justice of Policy Formation | Procedural Justice of Policy Implementation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Person-targeted behavior | 0.07 | 0.22*** | 0.07 |
| Community-targeted behavior | 0.00 | −0.34*** | −0.14* |
| Harassment | −0.20*** | −0.13* | −0.16** |
| Seriousness of terror | 0.02 | −0.03 | −0.03 |
| Police performance | — | −0.03 | 0.21*** |
| Total adjusted $R^2$ | 3%* | 10%*** | 9%*** |

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$; ***$p < 0.001$.

NOTES: The coefficients shown are the standardized regression coefficients (beta weights). The total adjusted $R^2$ is the amount of variance explained by all variables considered together.

SOURCE: OLS regression of data from 300-person random sample in-person survey of Muslims in Greater London.

# VII. DISCUSSION

The central aim of this study is to understand the circumstances in which members of the British Muslim community cooperate with police counterterrorism efforts. We hypothesized that there could be three mechanisms that might explain such cooperation: an instrumental model, a procedural justice model, and three variations on "ideological" theories of cooperation. The central finding of the study is that procedural justice concerns prove better predictors of cooperation of British Muslims in counterterrorism policing than either instrumental or ideological mechanisms. Indeed, we find no statistically significant relationship between instrumental or ideological mechanisms and any form of cooperation. By contrast, procedural justice furnishes a consistently robust basis for explaining both kinds of cooperative behavior under study here. This result suggests that the procedural justice model developed in the context of studies of U.S. policing has a broader scope both in terms of geographic locus and policing subject matter. The results of this study also point to a different procedural justice mechanism than that observed in other studies, including a contemporaneous and parallel study of U.S. Muslims, one in which legitimacy does not play a mediating role.

## A. Predicting Cooperation

At an initial matter, we found no support for either instrumental or ideological explanations for the production of police-community cooperation against terrorism. An instrumental model of cooperation could be supported by two different mechanisms. First, cooperation could be a product of the expected benefits of policing. Second, cooperation could be supplied as a strategy for avoiding unwelcome policing measures. Our study finds no evidence of either mechanism. First, people in the sample do not cooperate with the police because they think the police are effective or the threat of terror is great. The second instrumental mechanism is also not supported by the findings of this study. The

hypothesized mechanism would imply community expectations that police will dial down levels of harassment in the presence of cooperation and, accordingly, that people will be more willing to cooperate as they perceive harassment levels to be high. However, the data show, to the contrary, that when they feel harassed, people cooperate less.

We also hypothesized three possible mechanisms by which ideology could influence cooperation with the police based on views about (foreign policy) politics, terrorism as a tactic, or religion. Testing each of these three theories, this study finds no evidence to suggest that ideology has any role in predicting cooperation against terrorism. British Muslims in London appear not to change their behavior in respect to the police as they diverge from support for the foreign policy decisions of the British government. Nor do they change their conduct as they come to more willingly endorse terrorism as a political tool. Nor does self-identification as a Muslim appear to influence cooperation. A person's reported religiosity (or lack thereof) does not predict attitudes toward police. This last pair of findings parallels a finding in an analogous study of U.S. Muslims, which also found no correlation between religiosity and cooperation (Tyler et al. 2010). It suggests that religiosity alone does not present a public order question, contrary to some conventional claims (Philips 2007).

Interestingly, the study finds no correlation between judgments about terrorism as an instrument of political change and the willingness to cooperate with law enforcement against terrorism. The failure to find any relationship of this kind is especially striking because, as Table 2 illustrates, the sample included a range of views about terrorism, both positive and negative. Nontrivial segments of the sample stated that terrorism could, in some instances, be justified. However, this belief did not appear to influence attitudes toward cooperation with the police. Although the data do not provide a precise explanation of this effect, it would seem that the sampled British Muslim population distinguishes between terrorism as a local threat and terrorism as an abstract idea. That terrorism may be justified in some instances does not entail that it is justified now and here. This suggests complex judgments about means-ends rationality, with violence being seen as more acceptable under some conditions. Those judgments present a potential subject of further inquiry, with ramifications, for example, for the study of speech regulation for national security ends (Huq 2011).

Finally, the procedural justice model draws strong support from the results of this study. In this sample, procedural justice strongly predicted both forms of cooperation. Although willingness to work with the police at the local, personal level was correlated with procedural justice at both the policy formation and the policy implementation stages, cooperation in the form of alerting the police was correlated primarily with procedural justice at the policy implementation stage, and much less strongly with procedural justice in the formation of policy. These findings about the importance of procedural justice are generally consistent with other studies, including studies of Muslim Americans' interaction with counterterrorism policing (Tyler et al. 2010), which have also failed to identify robust support for instrumental explanations of cooperation with law enforcement (or compliance with the law). The findings presented here also parallel the findings of a larger body of procedural justice literature respecting crime control (Tyler 2006b).

These results are nevertheless subtly, but interestingly, divergent from results from a study by Tyler et al. of U.S. Muslims' responses to counterterrorism policing (Tyler et al. 2010). That study found that procedural justice in policy formation strongly influenced willingness to alert the police but was less strongly correlated with willingness to work with police directly, while procedural justice in implementation strongly influenced willingness to work with police directly but was less strongly correlated with willingness to alert. In the counterterrorism context, these results suggest, U.S. and British Muslims negotiating with the state attend to different components of the state's decision-making process. While U.S. Muslims focus on both policy formation and policy implementation (in different ways), British Muslims focus more on policy implementation, even while responding to changes in the modality of policy formation.

Given that most of prior procedural justice research focuses on policy implementation, these findings about the independent significance of policy formation are important and deserve further examination. Our survey instrument did not examine perceptions of different mechanisms for community input and participation in policy formation, but the difference between various modalities of consultation, participation, and collaboration may warrant study. An example from a period prior to this study is illustrative. In the wake of the July 2005 bomb attacks in London, the Blair government established seven working groups, which included members of the British Muslim community, to investigate extremism and recommend initiatives to tackle it. The working groups were given six weeks to finish reports. Two weeks after they wound up, the government published a 12-point plan for responding to domestic terrorism. According to one Muslim member of the House of Lords who participated in the working groups, the latter were given too little time to develop a meaningful analysis. The government's 12 measures were also drafted "without waiting for [the working group] to come up with [its] recommendations, or indeed, [its] analysis of the problems" (Oborne 2008:129). That government effort at community engagement was widely discounted as "shallow spin" and so may not have had a procedural justice effect (Oborne 2008:130). While any negative effects from the working groups may well have worn off by the time of our study, it is worth asking more generally how different forms of consultation, perceived in different ways, can have different procedural justice effects. That is, if consultation is to be part of the bundle of counterterrorism policies, how can it be designed influence positively community perceptions of fairness?

The results here diverge in another important respect from the parallel study of U.S. Muslims and from the body of procedural justice studies more generally. Unlike those studies, this study finds a gap between procedural justice and legitimacy. As explained above, people in our sample do not view the police as more legitimate because they are fair and therefore cooperate more with the police; rather, they looked directly to procedural justice without necessarily using that information to form a separate and distinct legitimacy judgment. In past studies, the effect of procedural justice on cooperation and compliance has been found to be mediated by legitimacy (Tyler 2006b). That is, people appear to form normative judgments about the police based on perceptions of procedural justice, and it is these second-order judgments that are drawn on when making cooperation and compliance decisions. The effect is not universal, and is not found in some studies conducted in China (Brockner et al. 2001). This study, by contrast,

does find that procedural justice has a direct effect on cooperation but also finds that legitimacy does not have an intermediating role. That is, procedural justice predicts both cooperation and legitimacy, but legitimacy has no independent role in explaining cooperation.

We find evidence that this decoupling is most pronounced for the part of the sample that has the weakest sense of identification with Britain. This suggests that a precondition for the formulation of normative judgments such as legitimacy that are directed at the state is a sense of identification with the state. To further study this result would require examining how legitimacy effects vary in other samples, in particular samples in which there is variance respecting identification with a state.

# VIII. Conclusion

The mechanisms of cooperation among British Muslims in efforts against terrorism importantly follow the procedural justice pathway identified in other literature, but they also diverge from the standard account because of the surprisingly minor role played by legitimacy. Whether there are distinctive psychological or sociological explanations for the divergence of the studied population is an important subject for further research.

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## Appendix

Because of limitations in the length of the interviews, some constructs were not measured using multi-item scales. As a consequence, some of the reliabilities were lower than the ideal level of 0.7–0.8 (Nunnally 1978). Some constructs were measured using only single items so reliability could not be computed. It is important to recognize these limits in these data. It is also important to seek opportunities to replicate these findings using scales with higher reliabilities.

*Work with the Police*

Respondents were asked "How willing would you be to": "Work with the police to educate people in your community about the dangers of terrorists and terrorism?"; "To volunteer time on nights and weekends to help patrol areas of your community so as to help free police time to deal with anti-terror activities?"; "To voluntarily attend a police call-in interview at a government office?"; and "To encourage members of your community to generally cooperate with police efforts to fight terrorism?" (1 = very unlikely to 4 = very likely) (alpha = 0.56).

*Alert the Police*

This variable was constructed by combining questions about whether the respondent felt that the issue was a police concern and whether he or she would report the issue to the police.

*Police Concern*

How concerned do you think the police should be about: "A person saying he or she had joined a group you consider politically radical"; "A person withdrawing from a mosque or another religious community without any explanation"; "A person overheard discussing their decision to help plant explosives in a terrorist attack"; "A person visiting an internet chat room or web site in which there is material posted that supports al Qaeda"; "A person reading religious literature you believe to be extremist"; "A person giving money to organizations that people say are associated with terrorists"; "A person talking about traveling overseas to fight for Muslims"; and "A person distributing material expressing support for al Qaeda" (1 = not at all concerned to 4 = very concerned) (alpha = 0.67).

*Likelihood of Reporting to the Police*

How likely would you be to report to the police: "A person saying he or she had joined a group you consider politically radical"; "A person withdrawing from a mosque or another religious community without any explanation"; "A person overheard discussing their decision to help plant explosives in a terrorist attack": "A person visiting an internet chat room or web site in which there is material posted that supports al Qaeda"; "A person reading religious literature you believe to be extremist"; "A person giving money to organizations that people say are associated with terrorists"; "A person talking about traveling overseas to

fight for Muslims"; and "A person distributing material expressing support for al Qaeda" (1 = very unlikely to 4 = very likely) (alpha = 0.75).

### Seriousness of Terror Risk

One question was asked. "Would you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly that . . . [t]here is a serious risk of a major terrorist attack in the UK" (agree strongly 4 percent; agree 16 percent; disagree 43 percent; disagree strongly 37 percent) (1 = agree strongly to 4 = disagree strongly).

### Police Performance

Two questions were asked: "How would you rate the police in terms of whether they are making you feel safe from the threat of terrorism?" (very bad 15 percent; bad 44 percent; good 37 percent; and very good 4 percent), and "If someone were planning a terrorist attack in London today, how likely do you think it is that they would be caught in advance" (not at all likely 8 percent; a little likely 42 percent; somewhat likely 43 percent; very likely 8 percent) (alpha = 0.76).

### Cooperate to Prevent Harm

One question was asked: "Some people think that if they do not help the police, the police will be more aggressive when they deal with the Muslim community. How often do you think this happens?" (usually 6 percent; sometimes 40 percent; seldom 44 percent; almost never 10 percent).

### The Fairness of Policy Formation

Three questions were asked. The first two begin: "How much does the government involve your community when": "Making decisions about what actions to take to address the threat of terrorism in your community" (not much at all 29 percent; a little 36 percent; some 28 percent; a great deal 7 percent); and "Trying to deal with problems in your community not related to terrorism" (not much at all 57 percent; a little 14 percent; some 26 percent; a great deal 3 percent). And "How often does the government convene meetings in your community to hear about community concerns about how the police should deal with the threat of terrorism?" (not often at all 34 percent; a few 37 percent; sometimes 24 percent; often 5 percent) (alpha = 0.76).

### The Fairness of Policy Implementation

Ten questions were asked reflecting overall procedural justice, quality of decision making, and quality of interpersonal treatment (alpha = 0.82). Respondents were asked if the police actions, when dealing with terrorism, act in certain ways: "Were the police fair in the procedures they use to handle the problems they deal with?" (very unfair 11 percent; somewhat unfair 28 percent; somewhat fair 53 percent; very fair 9 percent); "In how they treat people" (very unfair 8 percent; somewhat unfair 27 percent; somewhat fair 54 percent;

very fair 11 percent); "In giving people a chance to express their views before making decisions" (usually 12 percent; sometimes 26 percent; seldom 37 percent; almost never 25 percent); "In accurately understanding and applying the law" (usually 16 percent; sometimes 43 percent; seldom 28 percent; almost never 14 percent); "In making their decisions based upon facts, not their personal opinions" (usually 12 percent; sometimes 49 percent; seldom 32 percent; almost never 8 percent); "In applying the law consistently to everyone" (usually 12 percent; sometimes 47 percent; seldom 23 percent; almost never 18 percent); "In considering people's views when deciding what to do" (usually 13 percent; sometimes 31 percent; seldom 31 percent; almost never 25 percent); "Taking account of the needs and concerns of the people they deal with" (usually 15 percent; sometimes 32 percent; seldom 39 percent; almost never 15 percent); "In respecting people's rights" (usually 16 percent; sometimes 33 percent; seldom 36 percent; almost never 16 percent); and "In treating people with dignity and respect" (usually 7 percent; sometimes 39 percent; seldom 40 percent; almost never 14 percent).

*Legitimacy*

A five-item scale was used. That scale combined obligation and trust and confidence. The items were: "The police are legitimate authorities and you should obey their decisions" (agree strongly 5 percent; agree 78 percent; disagree 12 percent; disagree strongly 6 percent); "You should accept the decisions made by the police even when you disagree with them" (agree strongly 2 percent; agree 80 percent; disagree 10 percent; disagree strongly 8 percent); "It is our duty to obey the police even when we do not like the way they treat us" (agree strongly 5 percent; agree 40 percent; disagree 28 percent; disagree strongly 27 percent); "You trust the police to make decisions that are good for everyone when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism" (agree strongly 3 percent; agree 45 percent; disagree 38 percent; disagree strongly 14 percent): "People's rights are generally well protected by the police when they are investigating and prosecuting terrorism" (agree strongly 2 percent; agree 40 percent; disagree 47 percent; disagree strongly 11 percent) (alpha = 0.63).

*Morality*

A two-item scale was used: "The actions that the police take in dealing with terrorism are consistent with your own moral values" (agree strongly 5 percent; agree 40 percent; disagree 37 percent; disagree strongly 18 percent); and "Your own values about what is right and wrong agree with the laws and rules concerning how to deal with terrorism" (agree strongly 5 percent; agree 40 percent; disagree 45 percent; disagree strongly 10 percent) (alpha = 0.69).

*Is Terrorism Immoral?*

Three questions were asked: "Some people think that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets is sometimes justified to defend Islam against enemies. Do you think such violence is sometimes justified, is rarely justified or is never justified"

(sometimes 15 percent; rarely 28 percent; never 58 percent; reverse scored); "It is always morally wrong to commit a terrorist act that risks the lives of civilians" (agree strongly 61 percent; agree 30 percent; disagree 9 percent; disagree strongly 0 percent); and "Sometimes the long-term good to society that comes out of terrorist acts outweighs the short-term harm to the particular people injured or killed" (agree strongly 3 percent; agree 6 percent; disagree 68 percent; disagree strongly 23 percent"; reverse scored) (alpha = 0.64).

### Are the Ends of Terrorism Justified?

One question was asked: "Do you personally think that terrorist violence undertaken for political reasons is sometimes justified" (4 percent), "is rarely justified" (13 percent), "or is never justified" (84 percent).

### Support Government Foreign Policies?

Two questions were asked: "The U.K. made the right decision using military force in Afghanistan" (agree strongly 1 percent; agree 3 percent; disagree 32 percent; disagree strongly 64 percent); "Participation in the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq by the U.K. was necessary to combat threats of terrorism" (agree strongly 0 percent; agree 2 percent; disagree 28 percent; disagree strongly 70 percent) (alpha = 0.56).

### Identification as a Muslim

Four questions were asked: "Being a Muslim is important to the way that I think of myself as a person" (agree strongly 45 percent; agree 46 percent; disagree 8 percent; disagree strongly 0 percent); and "I am proud to be Muslim" (agree strongly 73 percent; agree 26 percent; disagree 0 percent; disagree strongly 0 percent); "What Islam stands for is important to me" (agree strongly 76 percent; agree 24 percent; disagree 0 percent; disagree strongly 0 percent); and "When someone praises Islam, it feels like a personal compliment to me" (agree strongly 58 percent; agree 42 percent; disagree 1 percent; disagree strongly 0 percent) (alpha = 0.54).

### Identification with the United Kingdom

Four questions were asked: "I am proud to be British" (agree strongly 31 percent; agree 53 percent; disagree 13 percent; disagree strongly 4 percent); "What the U.K. stands for is important to me" (agree strongly 22 percent; agree 50 percent; disagree 22 percent; disagree strongly 7 percent); "When someone praises the U.K., it feels like a personal compliment to me" (agree strongly 17 percent; agree 52 percent; disagree 30 percent; disagree strongly 1 percent); and "Being British is important to the way that I think of myself as a person" (agree strongly 24 percent; agree 56 percent; disagree 19 percent; disagree strongly 1 percent) (alpha = 0.57).

### Muslims Should Keep Separate

Two questions were asked: "Muslims should try to keep a separate cultural identity" (agree strongly 13 percent; agree 35 percent; disagree 41 percent; disagree strongly 11 percent);

and "Muslims in the U.K. today should try to remain distinct from the larger society" (agree strongly 4 percent; agree 6 percent; disagree 70 percent; disagree strongly 19 percent) (alpha = 0.86).

*How Religious Are You?*

Four questions were asked: "Would you say that religion is a very important part of your daily life" (very important 79 percent; somewhat important 20 percent; not very important 1 percent); "How often do you pray" (57 percent daily); "How often do you attend a mosque" (14 percent daily); and "How often do you take part in social or religious activities in a mosque or Islamic center" (5 percent daily) (alpha = 0.72).

*Muslims Are Respected by the British*

Respondents were asked: "Do you think that non-Muslim British": "Respect how you live your life" (agree strongly 20 percent; agree 19 percent; disagree 58 percent; disagree strongly 4 percent); "Respect what you contribute to England" (agree strongly 16 percent; agree 8 percent; disagree 71 percent; disagree strongly 5 percent); and "Respect what you believe" (agree strongly 4 percent; agree 7 percent; disagree 86 percent; disagree strongly 4 percent) (0.55).

*Muslims Are Discriminated Against in Society*

Three questions were asked concerning the fairness of treatment: "At work or in schools" (very unfair 13 percent; unfair 22 percent; fair 46 percent; or very fair 19 percent); "When dealing with authorities in public institutions" (very unfair 2 percent; unfair 23 percent; fair 55 percent; or very fair 20 percent ); and "In the media" (very unfair 42 percent; unfair 39 percent; fair 18 percent; or very fair 0 percent) (alpha = 0.42).

*Have You Changed Your Religious Practices?*

Respondents were asked: "How much have your changed your religious practices because of concerns about how you will be treated by others?": "Changed attendance at prayers?" (not much at all 78 percent; a little 16 percent; somewhat 2 percent; and a great deal 4 percent); "Changed how you dress in public" (not much at all 77 percent; a little 16 percent; somewhat 5 percent; and a great deal 1 percent): "Altered your everyday activities" (not much at all 78 percent; a little 16 percent; somewhat 5 percent; and a great deal 1 percent)or "Changed your travel behavior" (not much at all 80 percent; a little 15 percent; somewhat 3 percent; and a great deal 3 percent) (alpha = 0.82).

*Police Actions Directed at the Person*

"Search people on trains or the underground" (almost never 15 percent; seldom 23 percent; sometimes 48 percent; often 14 percent); "Come to people's homes to ask questions" (almost never 18 percent; seldom 32 percent; sometimes 40 percent; often

11 percent); and "Use informants from the community who are placed in mosques or community organizations" (almost never 13 percent; seldom 30 percent; sometimes 45 percent; often 13 percent) (alpha = 0.72).

*Police Actions Directed at the Community*

"Conduct electronic surveillance of mosques or community organizations" (almost never 12 percent; seldom 25 percent; sometimes 43 percent; often 19 percent); "Single out people on the streets for questioning and searches based upon ethnicity/religion" (almost never 8 percent; seldom 19 percent; sometimes 58 percent; often 15 percent); "Single out members of your ethnic or religious group for greater attention at immigration or at airport security" (almost never 10 percent; seldom 28 percent; sometimes 43 percent; often 19 percent); "Listen to the telephone calls or read the e-mail of people in your community" (almost never 14 percent; seldom 43 percent; sometimes 33 percent; often 10 percent); "Trace money contributed to Islamic charities by people in your community" (almost never 17 percent; seldom 31 percent; sometimes 32 percent; often 20 percent); "Put people from your community on trial for terror related crimes" (almost never 8 percent; seldom 23 percent; sometimes 44 percent; often 25 percent); and "Conduct raids on homes of people in your community to arrest people" (almost never 20 percent; seldom 27 percent; sometimes 36 percent; often 17 percent) (alpha = 0.82).

*Police Harass Muslims*

Would you agree or disagree that: "The police are especially suspicious of people from your community" (usually 21 percent; sometimes 42 percent; seldom 27 percent; almost never 10 percent); "Use too much force when dealing with people from your community" (usually 4 percent; sometimes 17 percent; seldom 30 percent; almost never 49 percent); "Threaten people from your community with physical harm" (usually 4 percent; sometimes 12 percent; seldom 9 percent; almost never 76 percent); and "Threaten to arrest or deport people from your community unless they cooperate" (usually 3 percent; sometimes 7 percent; seldom 17 percent; almost never 74 percent) (alpha = 0.60).

*Age*

Respondents indicated the year they were born.

*Education*

Respondents indicated their level of education.

*Income*

Respondents reported annual family income.

*Gender*

The interviewer coded gender.